National Défense
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B-GL-354-003/FP-001

LAND FORCE INFORMATION OPERATION - DECEPTION

(ENGLISH)

WARNING

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Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff

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Issued on Authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff

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FOREWORD

1. B-GL-354-003/FP-001, Land Force Information Operation-Deception, is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

2. Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through normal channels to Chief Land Staff, attention DAD 5.

3. Unless otherwise noted, masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

PREFACE

AIM

4. The aim of Land Force Information Operation-Deception, is to describe the concepts and doctrine for the application of deception in a theatre of operation.

SCOPE

5. The doctrine and concepts outlined in this publication are applicable to the tactical level of command in war and Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

6. This manual, Land Force Information Operation-Deception, amplifies and complements the doctrine presented in the B-GL-300-001/FP-000, Land Force Volume 1, The Conduct of Land Operations – Operational level doctrine for the Canadian army, B-GL-300-002/FP-001, Land Force Tactical Doctrine for the Canadian army and B-GL-300-005/FP-001, Land Force Information Operations. Which, is the basis for Canadian army doctrine for the conduct of operations and for the integration of information operations.

7. The terminology used in this publication is consistent with that of B-GL-331-003/FP-001, Army Vocabulary and AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

RECORD OF CHANGES

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BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION FUNDAMENTALS
REVITALIZING THE "LOST ART"

"And, after all, what is a lie? 'tis but the truth in masquerade"

George Gordon, Lord Byron, Don Juan, Canto XI

SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

GENERAL

1. History has shown that there is a potential payoff to be gained by using battlefield deception. Wise military planners throughout history have used deception. It is a low cost and effective way to cause the enemy to waste his efforts. Imaginative use of deception, coupled with aggressive training, improves combat effectiveness at all levels. Throughout military history, though, commanders viewed deception as a warfighting need. Deception is an important tool which enables a commander to attack the enemy commander's mind and therefore to contribute to his defeat from the moral perspective. Today, commanders use little deception in planning, directing, and conducting operations. As a result, many deception-related skills that have served us well in the past have been forgotten. This is caused by the following factors and the myths discussed later in this chapter:

a. Advances in technology are perceived to make successful deception more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

b. Commanders are reluctant to devote scarce resources, including time, to tasks that are considered less essential.

c. Force development, being primarily focused on hardware and on higher-cost force structure and materiel initiatives, has pushed low-cost, perceived intangibles like deception further into the background.

d. Most of the Canadian warfighting doctrine until now was also associated to a more attritional approach that did not put emphasis on the moral aspect of combat.

2. This manual attempts to redress the current shortfalls. It must be noted, however, that NATO does not have an alliance deception doctrine and therefore has no unified vision of this warfighting tool. This manual draws most of its higher level concepts form the US Army Manual, FM 90-2 Deception, and uses the US doctrine to explain the operational and higher tactical concepts. This approach is similar to the use of a US structure, (X Allied Corps), as a teaching tool due to a lack of agreed alliance structure in NATO. **This manual focuses on:**

a. the application of principles of war to the conduct of operations;

b. the application of manoeuvre warfare doctrinal tenets to the conduct of military operations; and

c. the integration of Information Operation including Command and Control Warfare and Protection aspects of deception.

3. Although the advantages of deception have been proven in most wars, only the most astute of commanders have used it effectively. One of the most recent examples of deception was the use of embarked US Marines during the Golf War to reinforce the Iraqi leadership's belief that the main assault would come along the coast of Kuwait. This deception plan contributed to a quick defeat of the forces in Kuwait by VII and XVIII US Corps.

MYTHS

4. The following myths contribute to reasons why deception is not more widely used and understood:

a. Surprise comes from luck. Experience has taught us that surprise can be greatly enhanced by deception. A study of military encounters since 1914 shows that deception almost certainly results in surprise. On the other hand, if deception is not used, surprise is achieved only about 50 percent of the time.

b. Deception plays a trivial part in warfare and is not for real soldiers. This myth is dispelled by the writings of such leaders as General George S. Patton. In 1945 he wrote that he believed deception and cover should be a normal part of the planning for any campaign.

c. Tremendous growth in intelligence collection capabilities has destroyed the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent. The truth is that the greater the collection capability an opponent has, the greater the opportunity to feed him specifically designed false information. Additionally, historical studies indicate that tactical warning of attack was provided in about 78 percent of all military encounters studied since 1914. Even so, if deception was successfully used, the enemy ignored the warning and was surprised by the attack.

d. Deception is only for combatants. In the 1973 Middle East War, the Egyptians brought the Israelis to the brink of defeat in five days. The Egyptian plan included 150 deception ploys of economic, political, and military natures. A team of 40 people began working in February 1973 on construction projects, false reports, and many other non-combat activities, in preparation for the October 6 invasion.

DEFINITION OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION

5. Battlefield deception consists of those operations conducted at theatre level and below which purposely mislead enemy decision makers by:

a. distortion;

b. concealment;

c. falsification of indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities or dispositions;

d. inducement of enemy decision makers; and

e. operational or tactical actions which are favourable to, and exploitable by, friendly combat operations.

6. The following goals of battlefield deception are general enough to be applicable to most situations, regardless of echelon or type of conflict:

a. Coordinate operational deception measures to maintain a coherent story portrayal at strategic and Army echelons.

b. Mask an increase or a redeployment of forces and weapon systems, which have been spotted by the enemy.

c. Block the enemy's perception and identification of new weapons or forces being introduced into combat.

d. Distract the enemy's attention from other activities.

e. Overload enemy intelligence collection and analytical capabilities.

f. Create the illusion of strength where weakness exists.

g. Create the illusion of weakness where strength exists.

h. Condition the enemy to particular patterns of friendly behaviour that are operationally exploitable at the appropriate time.

i. Confuse enemy expectations with regard to the size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment, intent or style of mission.

j. Execute to effect surprise in these areas.

SECTION 2
DECEPTION MAXIMS

INTRODUCTION

7. Achievement of the above goals relies on deception maxims or principles that are supported by historical deception-related evidence or come from social science, decision analysis and game theory. Others are anecdotal in nature; although they make common sense but have not been formally tested. Nevertheless, they have served as useful theoretical guidelines for the formulation of this doctrine. The 10 maxims are:

a. Magruder's principles, the exploitation of perceptions;

b. limitations to human information processing;

c. cry-wolf;

d. Jones' dilemma;

e. a choice among types of deception;

f. Axelrod's contribution, the husbanding of assets;

g. a sequencing rule;

h. the importance of feedback;

i. the Monkey's Paw; and

j. care in the design of planned placement of deceptive material.

MAGRUDER'S PRINCIPLES, THE EXPLOITATION OF PERCEPTIONS

8. **It is generally easier to induce an enemy to maintain a pre-existing belief than to present notional evidence to change that belief.** Thus, it may be more useful to examine how an enemy's existing beliefs can be turned to advantage than to attempt to change his beliefs.

9. Perhaps the most striking application of this principle in military deception is to be found in the selection of the invasion site and cover plan for the D-Day invasion at Normandy. It is well established that Hitler and almost all of his senior military advisors believed that the most likely place for the allied invasion of Europe would be in the Pas de Calais region. Moreover, the Allies were aware of this belief as ULTRA intercept had confirmed that Hitler believed the Allies would invade at Pas de Calais.

10. This preconception formed the basis of an elaborate deception plan keyed to reinforce this belief. "If deception targets tend to perceive what they expect, then these expectations furnish greater leverage to a deception plan—a form of mental jujitsu."[1] This principle appears to be well appreciated by deception planners and is consistent with numerous studies on the psychology of perception.

[1] Jervis, Robert, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics (APR 68), P. 455.

11. There is ample historical evidence to confirm the truth of Magruder's Principles. The table of Figure 1-1 contains entries from a historical database. These entries (including both strategic and tactical cases) have been categorised as follows:

a. whether or not deception was employed;

b. whether or not plans were keyed to enemy preconceptions; and

c. whether or not surprise was achieved.

12. Two conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of this information. First, according to the data in 110 out of 131 cases (84 percent), deception schemes have more often than not been keyed to enemy preconceptions. This supports the perception that historical deception planners believed in the principles. Second, when deception is keyed to enemy preconceptions, the probability of surprise is greater.

Was deception employed?	**Were plans keyed to enemy preconception?**	**Was surprise achieved?**			**Total**
		YES	**NO**	**UKN**	
YES	yes	106	4	0	110
	no	17	4	0	21
	unknown	8	1	0	9
NO	yes	8	0	0	106
	no	5	1	0	17
	unknown	12	58	0	8
UNKNOWN	yes	0	0	1	1
	no	0	0	1	1
	unknown	0	0	6	6
TOTAL		156	68	8	232

Figure 1-1: Relationship between deception, preconception and surprise.

LIMITATIONS TO HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING

13. There are two limitations to human information processing that are exploitable in the design of deception schemes:

a. the law of small numbers, and

b. susceptibility to conditioning.

LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS

14. **"The law of small numbers" is the name given to describe a human weakness in intuitive inference also called "best guesses"**. Three events are presented as examples to demonstrate this principle. In each example, critical inference and subsequent decision were drawn on the basis of a very small sample of data[2]:

a. **Lack of alertness on the part of German troops on the eve of the Normandy invasion**. "All along the chain of German command the continuing bad weather acted like a tranquillizer. The various headquarters were quite confident that there would be no attacks in the immediate future. Their reasoning was based on a carefully assessed weather evaluat*i*on that had been made of the allied landings in North Africa, Italy and Sicily. In each case conditions had varied but meteorologist like Snabe and his chief in Berlin, Dr Karl Sonntag, had noted that the Allies had never attempted a landing unless the prospect of favourable weather was almost certain, particularly for covering air operations. To the methodical German mind there was no deviation from the rule; the weather had to be just right or the Allies wouldn't attack. And the weather wasn't just right."[3] This was reinforced as a result of allied attacks

[2] Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., "The Belief in the Law of Small Numbers," Psychological Bulletin 76 (1971), pp. 105-110. (Paraphrased)

[3] Ryan, C., The Longest Day, pp 79-80

of important German weather stations to ensure they did not have access to the data upon which allied weather forecast were based and therefore were unable to predict the possible weather break on D-Day. Even though extensive deception operations were used in Normandy, the timing of the invasion was not specifically included in these plans.

b. **Stalin's belief that the Germans would issue an ultimatum before an invasion of Russia**. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia in 1941, a strategic assumption is reflected in Stalin's belief that Hitler must issue an ultimatum before war would break out. The fact that prior to 8 April 1941, Germany had made ultimate demands before undertaking military action convinced Stalin that this pattern would continue in the future[4]. In this case again the sample size on which this assumption was based was less than five previous actions.

c. **The view expressed by some intelligence analysts that Khruschev would not place offensive missiles in Cuba**. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a major failure of intelligence evaluation was the predisposition of the US intelligence community's philosophical conviction this it would be incompatible with Soviet policy. Khruschev had never put medium or long-range missile in any satellite country. It was therefore assumed that he certainly would not put them on an island 1 600 km away from the Soviet Union and only 140 km away from the United States, when this was bound to provoke a sharp American reaction[5]. Again this was based on a sample of less than five previous events.

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO CONDITIONING

15. **Another limitation of human information processing relevant to deception planning is the frequent inability of targets to detect small changes in**

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[4] Ba-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks", World Politics, Vol 28 No 3 April 1976, p 384

[5] Wohistetter, R., "Cuba and Pear Harbour: Hindsight and Foresight", Foreign Affairs, Vol 43, July 1965, p 701

indicators, even if the cumulative change over time is large. This is the basis for the use of conditioning as a deception technique.

16. Conditioning or desensitising has an important place in the design of deception schemes. There are numerous instances of its successful application. One now-classic application of this principle was made in the breakout of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen from Brest on 12 February 1942. Jamming British radar facilitated the breakout. Ordinarily this would have been a significant tip-off that something was amiss, but British radar operators dismissed it as being caused by atmospheric disturbance. This error was the result of a carefully orchestrated German ruse directed by General Wolfgang Martini, the head of the Luftwaffe Signals Service. The Germans jammed the British radar sites every day at the same time to build their belief that the atmosphere was interrupting the receipt of any signals. The British became so accustomed to the atmospheric problems that the ships were able to escape.

17. The Germans did not have a monopoly on this concept. The RAF frequently employed it for feints or diversionary operations. One example was prior to the British attack on Peenemunde on August 17, 1943. Over a period of time, the British had routinely sent Mosquitoes along the same route to bomb Berlin. This ensured that all personnel in cities along the route were constantly forced to flee to bomb shelters and that German air assets were repeatedly engaged over Berlin. On the night Peenemunde was attacked, the Germans were deceived into believing that the eight Mosquitoes were the vanguard of another attack on Berlin. The result of this deception was a highly successful ruse. At the cost of one aircraft lost to German fighters, the eight Mosquito bombers used in the diversion lured 203 enemy fighters to Berlin. Of 597 British bombers dispatched to Peenemunde, only 40 were lost and 32 damaged. All but 26 managed to attack the target. If the ruse had not been successful, it is quite possible, as one German post-war account claimed, that an additional 160 bombers would have been shot down.

18. A final remark about the weaknesses of human information processing is that the reading of the literature suggests that targets tend to dismiss unlikely events as impossible events. Such an idea favours bold and imaginative strategies such as Hannibal crossing the Alps or the landing at Inchon.

CRY WOLF

19. **Several events, described below, show how repeated false alarms (cry-wolf) have historically contributed to surprise**. There is no doubt that cry-wolf is

an established element in indications and warning intelligence work. This method of desensitising an enemy before an attack has been very effective as shown below

a. **Pearl Harbour**. First there is the "Cry-Wolf" phenomenon. This phrase was actually used before the attack on Pearl Harbour concerning warnings about the Japanese. An excess of warning that turns out to be false alarms induces a kind of fatigue, a lowering of sensitivity. The US Navy was tired of checking out Japanese submarine reports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbour. In the week preceding the attack, they had checked out seven, all of which were false. Although there was an extensive cover and deception plan for the attack on Pearl Harbour, there is no evidence that desensitization was part of that plan.

b. **Australia's Pearl Harbour.** A naval coast watcher reported what he believed to be naval vessels off the coast of Australia. Previously, there had been a series of unconfirmed sightings that had been checked out and had proven to be false. A senior intelligence officer at Navy Headquarters in Darwin explained that warning information, which reached him 30 minutes prior the attack, was disregarded because a series of earlier sightings had proven false. The attack on Darwin occurred on 19 February 1942, some 10 weeks after Pearl Harbour.

c. **Korea 1950**. Intelligence sources had indicated a North Korean build-up numerous times before the June 1950 attack on South Korea. There was nothing in the intelligence reports that would indicate something was about to happen at that time.

d. **Vietnam 1968.** Every Year, US Headquarters in Saigon predicted a winter-spring offensive that never occurred. As a result the warnings issued before the TET offensive were ignored.

e. **Israel 1973**. Many times over the period of a year, the same source provided information that the war would breakout on a specific date. Each time, that day would come and go without an attack. This happened so often that when the source provided the date of the real attack, no one believed him. Israel had actually mobilized in response to an earlier warning that never happened. Considering the prohibitive cost of this mobilization in time, resources, personnel and money, senior intelligence officers did not want to make such a mistake again.

20. In a paper entitled "Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore," prepared by the Office of Research and Development, Central Intelligence Agency, June 1981, the cry-wolf syndrome alone, and false alarms combined with other deception techniques were analysed to see if they contributed to creating surprise.

21. The data showed that when cry-wolf techniques were combined with other deception methods, surprise was achieved 92 percent of the time. However, when deception techniques that did not include false alerts were used, surprise resulted in only 67 percent of the cases studied. The analyst concluded, from this statistical analysis, that combining the effects of false alerts with other deception techniques seemed to increase the chances of achieving surprise. In fact, in 23 cases, when wolf was cried and deception was attempted, surprise was achieved 100 percent of the time.

JONES' DILEMMA

22. **Deception becomes more difficult as the number of channels of information available to the target increases**. However, within limits, the greater the number of controlled channels the greater the likelihood the deception will be believed.

A CHOICE AMONG TPES OF DECEPTION

23. **Where possible, the objective of the deception planner should be to reduce the uncertainty in the mind of the target, to force him to seize upon a notional world view as being correct; not making him less certain of the truth, but more certain of a particular falsehood.** However, increasing the range of alternatives and the evidence supporting any of many incorrect alternatives—also known as increasing the noise --may have particular use when the target already has several elements of truth in his possession.

24. It is convenient to classify deception into two types: A (for ambiguity deception) and M (for misdirection deception). A-deception increases doubt in the target's mind and lowers the probability of a correct perception by taking from or adding to alternatives. M-deception reduces uncertainty in the target's mind by having him become convinced of a particular falsehood. Either form of deception can be accomplished, incidentally, by telling only the truth. A-deception can function by:

a. altering the probabilities attached to various outcomes in the mind of the target;

b. diluting or burying useful information in noise; or

c. altering the perceived range of options and outcomes available to the target.

25. A classic analysis of the Pearl Harbour surprise borrowed the concepts of signal and noise from communications theory. To understand the fact of surprise, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of the noise as well as the signals that, after the event, are clearly seen to herald the attack.[6]

26. On the other hand, the deception architecture to overpower or swamp the signal can create noise. "The idea is to give your target a kaleidoscope to play with, and then let him use it as a looking glass."[7]

27. A simple example of a defence game shows this idea more clearly. Suppose an attacker has a choice between two locations to attack. The defender can choose to defend either location. Given this scenario, the attacker has an even chance of choosing an undefended location to attack. But, what if the attacker could convince the defender that there were three possible locations for the attack? If he could, the success probability then climbs from two to three, and so forth. The probability would reach unity as a mathematical limit when the number of threatened sites grows arbitrarily too large. It is necessary that the options introduced by the attacker be both individually and collectively plausible to the target.

28. As a practical matter, the number of threats cannot arbitrarily grow too large. Deception planners who worked on the invasion of Sicily appreciated this fact: "It was decided, very wisely, that to mount so many threats in the Mediterranean would stretch the Germans' credulity too far. Moreover, the fact that Sicily was almost the only objective not threatened might lead them to guess the truth. To prevent this, the simulated threats to north and west France, Pantelleria, and Lampedusa were abandoned."[8]

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6 Wohlstetter, Roberta, "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision," (a synopsis of her ideas)

7 Eric Ambler, Send No More Roses, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson Limited, 1977, p. 62

8 Cruickshank, C., Deception in World War II, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 52

29. The foregoing discussion is purposely oversimplified, but it clearly shows the principle of A-deception.

30. In contrast to A-deception, M-deception (or misdirection) reduces uncertainty. The strategy of misdirection is clear: to make the enemy very certain, very determined and completely wrong. In the attack/defence game used earlier, M-deception would require the attacker to convince the defender to defend one site, while attacking the other.

31. Deception schemes used in practice are usually combinations of A and M types, with one or the other being dominant. Such was the case at Normandy. The multiple attack location threats in the initial stages are evidence of A-deception. In the end phases, however, Normandy was predominantly an M-deception. Historically, deception professionals seem to have preferred M-deception; for after all, who can resist the ultimate triumph of "the sting?"

AXELROD'S CONTRIBUTION: THE HUSBANDING OF ASSETS

32. **There are circumstances where deception assets should be kept in reserve despite the costs of maintenance and risk of waste, awaiting a more fruitful use.**

33. Window, later renamed Chaff by the Americans, was easily the most cost-effective electronic countermeasure (ECM) deception device introduced in World War II. At first however, the British were reluctant to use Chaff for two reasons. First, they were afraid that the Germans also had this capability and second, the British had not been able to develop an effective countermeasure. However, after many debates, the British decided to employ Chaff and did so with much success.

34. It is also interesting to note that concern is often exaggerated over whether an asset will become valueless through the development of countermeasures once used or compromised. In spite of the concern over the first use of Chaff, it is still considered effective in today's sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) environment.

35. Other examples of holding deception assets in reserve until the right moment include:

a. the employment of ULTRA in World War II;

b. the Syrian decision to withhold use of its new SAM defence despite heavy losses until the opportune time in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; and

c. the use of double agents by Britain in connection with the Normandy deception.

36. It may pay to wait for high stakes despite risks of compromise and/or costs of maintenance. This maxim is of particular interest since, as Axelrod stated in "The Rational Timing of Surprise": "One can see that it would be a mistake to evaluate the opponent's resources for surprise by what you have seen when the stakes were low or moderate. He may be rationally waiting for an event with sufficiently large stakes to justify the exploitation of whatever resource for surprise he has."

37. Therefore, given an assumed constancy in stakes, it is hazardous to draw conclusions from limited data (recall the discussion regarding the law of small numbers). Also, rational analysis suggests that an enemy's actions may well be different when the stakes are high. In this case, prior experience simply may not be relevant.

A SEQUENCING RULE

38. **Deception activities should be sequenced so as to maximise the portrayal of the deception story for as long as possible**. In other words, red-handed activities, i.e. indicators of true friendly intent, should be deferred to the last possible instant.

39. This principle is illustrated by an example from World War II; the Allies' surprise at the German attack on Norway. The Allies had detected German ships moving toward Norway but misinterpreted their mission intent because they had expected an attempt to break through the allied blockade into the Atlantic. [9]

40. Deferring the riskier portions of deception may provide an advantage in that, even if the deception plan is compromised, the enemy will not have sufficient time to recover and take appropriate action-surprise.

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[9] Jervis, Robert,"Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics 20, no. 3, Apr 68, Hypothesis no. 14

IMPORTANCE OF FEEDBACK

41. **A scheme to ensure accurate feedback increases the chances of successful deception. This principle is virtually self-evident.**

42. Perhaps the most dramatic example of the role of feedback in wartime deception was the intelligence provided by ULTRA, the top-secret espionage and cryptographic breakthrough that enabled the British to read the German codes. In the view of many, ULTRA information was a key element in the success of the allied invasion of Normandy. As Lewin pointed out in "ULTRA Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents" (Colonel John) Bevan, head of LCS, and Lt. Col. T.A. Robertson, head of the B1a section of MI5, have jointly testified that—"without ULTRA the great web of deception spun around the Germans could never have been devised. Yet without their efforts, OVERLORD might have been a disaster." [10]

43. Even at the simplest operational level, feedback answers the question, "Is anybody listening?" (Is this channel effective?) It is an interesting footnote to the overall success of the Allies D-Day deception that those directed at Norway were not successful.

44. Ironically, the Allies knew through ULTRA that German troops remained in Norway, and concluded on the basis of this feedback that the deception was successful. "On Sherlock Holmes' famous observation about the importance of the dog that did not bark in the night, the significant fact for the deceivers in London was that no such major movement of troops from Norway was disclosed on ULTRA up to and beyond the time of D-Day. Here was clinching evidence that the deception plans were working."[11]

45. Yet it was a completely wrong assessment. Hitler did not move his forces because Norway was his "zone of destiny", not because he believed the British deception plan.

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[10] Lewin, Ronald, Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's

[11] Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents, 1978, p. 299. 12 Ibid, p. 310

THE MONKEY'S PAW

46. **Deception efforts may produce subtle and unwanted side effects**. Planners should be sensitive to such possibilities and, where prudent, take steps to minimise these counter-productive aspects.

47. Deception security is one of the causes of such side effects. One of the cardinal principles of deception folklore is that deception security is of highest importance. It is generally acknowledged that the number of knowledgeable people should be minimised, even to the point of misleading your own forces.

48. A good example of short circuiting an unwanted side effect occurred during World War II. Propagandists needed to convince the Germans that an allied attack was imminent. They needed to accomplish this without encouraging resistance groups to go into action in support of an attack that would never materialise and without exposing them to German reprisals.

49. "In any case, it was bad for morale if hopes of liberation were raised by the voice of London" only to be dashed. But in France the PWE had already cried "wolf" twice—"and there was a real danger that French Resistance would cease to believe anything London said."[12]

50. Fortunately, this problem was anticipated and elegantly countered. Cruickshank wrote in Deception in World War II: "In connection with the otherwise unsuccessful operation "STARKEY"", for instance, the BBC broadcast this subtle message: "Be careful of German provocation. We have learned that the Germans are circulating inspired rumours that we are concentrating armies on our coasts with intentions of invading the continent. Take no notice, as these provocations are intended to create among you manifestations and disorders that the Germans will use as an excuse for repressive measures against you. Be disciplined, use discretion, and maintain order, for when the time comes for action you will be advised in advance." [13]

51. Thus, it was left to the Germans to decide the significance of the message and the possibility it might be a clever ruse, while ensuring that the resistance leaders had no basis for action.

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12 Cruickshank, Charles, Deception in World War II, 1979, p. 56

13 Ibid

52. Another example of the Monkey's Paw effect concerns the unanticipated consequences of an otherwise successful German use of decoy V-2 sites. As Jones stated in "Irony as a Phenomenon in Natural Science and Human Affairs" "Here the Germans, perhaps following their experience of our bombing of their V-1 sites, sought to decoy us with spoof sites for their V-2 rockets. Actually, we had a very incomplete picture of their rocket organisation in France, until we landed on D-Day and afterwards captured a map showing the deployment of the rocket organisation west of the Seine. This included not only the actual storage sites with legends bearing their actual capacities, but also the spoof sites as well. These were individually numbered from 15 to 20, running east to west. It was therefore a fair inference that there were 14 spoof sites east of the Seine, and it was reasonable to assume that German thoroughness would have decided on a fixed ratio of spoof sites per rockets stored on a genuine site. On this assumption, it was possible to estimate the number of rockets stored east of the Seine, and hence to estimate the intended monthly rate of fire. The answer came out at about 800: after the war, we found that the intended rate of fire had been 900 a month. We had, therefore, managed to achieve an 88 percent accuracy in our estimate, which would not have been possible had the Germans not tried to deceive us."[14]

53. A final example of the Monkey's Paw effect dates from 1940 to 1941 in East Africa. General Wavell wanted the Italians to believe that he was planning to attack them in Abyssinia from the south of a position. In this way, he hoped to divert Italian forces from the point of intended attack in the north. As pointed out by Mure in Master of Deception, however: "The deception went very well and the Italians fell for the story of the attack in the south, with a result which was exactly the reverse of what Wavell wanted. They drew back in the south, presumably in the expectation that the attack there was bound to succeed and the damage to their forces would be less if a withdrawal was made perhaps to a shorter line and no pitched battle was joined. At the same time, they sent what they could spare to reinforce the Northern Flank where they did not expect an attack but which was the true British objective. The valuable lesson learned was that the deception plan must be based on what you want the enemy to do, never on what you want him to think. Next time, also in Abyssinia, Dudley arranged for the Italians to find out exactly where the British attack was to be made and this ensured that there was no opposition. "[15]

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[14] Jones, R.V., "Irony as a Phenomenon in Natural Science and Human Affairs," Chemistry and Industry,1968, p. 473

[15] David Mure, Master of Deception, 1980, pp. 81-82

54. The point to be drawn from the foregoing examples is that there may be subtle costs to a deception that should enter into the deceiver's cost-benefit analysis. It is unrealistic to expect that all possible unwanted side effects can be foreseen. However, sensitivity to such possibilities is desirable.

CARE IN THE DESIGN OF PLANNED PLACEMENT OF DECEPTIVE MATERIAL

55. **Great care must be exercised in the design of schemes to leak notional plans to the enemy**. Apparent windfalls are subject to close scrutiny and are often disbelieved. On the other hand, genuine leaks often occur under circumstances thought improbable.

56. Two incidents serve to illustrate this principle. One occurred when, early in World War II, a German aircraft heading for Cologne became lost and made a forced landing near Malines in Belgium. The three passengers, two Wehrmacht officers and a Luftwaffe major, were soon arrested by Belgian authorities. They were taken to the police station and left alone briefly. They made an attempt to burn some documents they were carrying. They were top secret documents containing attack plans for Holland and Belgium. However, the documents failed to burn and fell into the hands of Belgian authorities. The authorities believed that the documents were a part of a deception plan, because the Germans could not be careless enough to allow actual war plans to fall into the hands of the Allies.

57. A second example occurred in the North African campaigns. Alam el Halfa, a ridge roughly 25 km behind the Alamein line, was a natural stronghold. It was an excellent defensive position for the British at that stage in the war. It could, however, be outflanked by advancing Germans who might be able to attack on to Alexandria.

58. The British maps of the area were excellent, being based on captured Italian maps corrected by aerial photographs. One type of British map was thought particularly valuable by both British and German armies-- the so-called "going map." This map showed colour-coded regions denoting how difficult the terrain was and the speed, which could be maintained by various vehicles. The British decided to print a false going map showing that a flanking movement would present rough going, whereas the route direct to the Alam el Halfa region was easily plausible. The map was secretly printed and placed in an armoured car to be captured by the Germans. The plan worked and the Germans came directly to Alam el Halfa (over rough going, incidentally).

59. These examples show both kinds of misclassification errors. In the Belgian case, a real windfall was dismissed as false. In North Africa, a false map was accepted as real. A common characteristic of successful deceptions is that they were designed to co-opt scepticism by requiring some participation by the target: Either a physical effort in obtaining the evidence or an analytic effort in interpreting it. There is a risk however that the deception story might not be perceived at all if it is too subtle.

60. There is a delicate balance to be struck between obviousness and subtlety, with the attendant twin risks that the message will either be misunderstood or dismissed as a plot. To the deception professional, this is the essence of the art.

SECTION 3
DECEPTION FAILURES

INTRODUCTION

61. There are generally two categories of deception failures:

a. those resulting from detection by the intended victim—the target; and

b. those resulting from inadequate design or implementation by the deceiver.

62. Most obvious is the case where the potential target sees through the deception and either ignores it or mounts a counter-effort, (counter-deception), of his own. The deception can also fail to achieve the desired objective for one or more of the following reasons:

a. incomplete or misunderstanding of the target's intelligence apparatus;

b. incomplete or incorrect modelling of the deception process;

c. inadequate or improper channels or means to convey the deception story;

d. incomplete or inadequate control over the important variables of the deception process;

e. incorrect assessment of the target's reaction;

f. deception story falls outside the deception window: too sophisticated to be received, or too simplistic to be believed;

g. unreasonable expectations;

h. target's inability to react in the intended manner even if deception is considered credible;

i. inadequate time for the deception process to run its course; and

j. plain bad luck can cause detection or inadequacy, or both.

63. The seven operations describe in the following sections provide good examples of deception failures.

ALBION

64. The first deception plan was code-named Albion. It was an elaborate deception to cover the mobilisation and movement of forces to the East for the attack on Russia. The plan contained two major operational components, SHARK and HARPOON.

65. SHARK was intended to convey the impression that a large combined force would invade the Southeast coast of England at four locations between Folkestone and Worthing. The combined force, to include eight infantry divisions, was to be preceded by an airborne unit to 'secure beachheads and, if possible, to take a number of airfields.' The Luftwaffe was to achieve air superiority, protect the invasion fleet, drop the airborne units, support the ground forces, and airlift additional ground troops. Naval units were also supposed to participate in clearing invasion routes through the British minefield, transport the invasion force, and provide covering fire during the landing.

66. Originally intended to begin in March and April 1941, directions and planning were slow, probably because of the pressure of real operations that almost invariably took precedence over deception. Preliminary actual steps included highly visible training exercises, swimming instructions for non-swimmers, paradrops and beach assaults using blank cartridges but real landing craft. This latter activity was a major deficiency in the deception story. Since only five landing barges and 10 fishing

smacks were available to transport the assault force, the deception activities were not believable.

67. A cover operation for SHARK, designated HARPOON, was nationally intended to draw British forces away from the "intended assault" area this added credibility to the "attack". Two operations were planned:

a. HARPOON NORTH was to be an attack from Norway and Denmark in the area between Tynemouth and Berwick.

b. HARPOON SOUTH was to be launched from the Brittany Peninsula against the Southwest coast of England in the area of Lyme Bay.

68. In the case of both the SHARK and HARPOON deceptions, two problems contributed to their apparent lack of success:

a. Hitler's unreasonable expectation that the British were more vulnerable than they actually were.

b. The British, who correctly perceived that five landing barges would not be sufficient for any invasion, may have been aware of a lack of resources.

69. One or both of these shortcomings appear to be a common element in operational-level deception failures.[16]

ELEPHANTIASIS

70. The second example is a World War II German tactical deception attempted against the Russians in early 1942, which had a very unpleasant result. Code-named ELEPHANTIASIS, the operation consisted of deceptive radio transmissions. They were intended to convince the Russians that a lightly held sector of the front in the area east of Vyasma, 200 kilometres Southwest of Moscow, was actually defended by

[16] Wilt, Dr Alan F., "'SHARK' and 'HARPOON': German Cover Operations against Great Britain in 1941," Military Affairs, vol 38, no. 1, Feb 74, pp. 1-2 (Discussion)

a heavy force of the Fourth Army. The Russians quickly attacked with a superior force and to quote one participant: “It was a mess.”

71. It is unclear whether the Russians saw through the deception, or simply decided their forces were adequate to overcome the large force the Germans were trying to portray. In either case, the deception was not successful. It probably failed for the following reasons:

a. it was single channel, relying totally on radio transmission rather than a blend of other means and measures;

b. it had, to some degree, an unrealistic expectation of success; and

c. there was an intelligence failure to anticipate the possible Russian reaction of deploying a greater force to attack.

SOVIET TACTICAL RADIO DECEPTION

72. The third example occurred during World War II, when Soviet radio deception attempts against the Germans along the Eastern Front were common, but generally unsuccessful. Careful German analysis of other available intelligence (air reconnaissance and agent reporting) revealed the true deceptive nature of the attempts. They were, as in the ELEPHANTIASIS operation, single-channel efforts with no additional means or measures used to support the deception and enhance plausibility. Probably more significant was the frequency of the attempts. A deception occurred about once every two weeks. It is probable that the Soviet command structure and intelligence apparatus were desensitised to the point of ignoring the ploys. While such repetitive actions are sometimes used to lull an adversary into a false sense of security prior to a genuine attack, the careless and poorly structured nature of these efforts probably revealed them as deceptions.

COCKADE

73. The fourth example is probably the largest scale deception failure on record. It was the World War II Allied operation code-named COCKADE. Conceived in early 1943, its major objective was to conceal the weaknesses of allied forces in Britain. COCKADE was intended to discourage the transfer of enemy forces to the Russian front. It had three sub-elements: STARKEY, TINDALL, and WADHAM. STARKEY, the major component, was composed of a number of separate but

presumably mutually supporting operations, including actual training exercises, air and naval operations, and combined operations (commando) teams.

74. The story was to imply a large-scale amphibious attack against the coast of France. Its objective was to lure German aircraft into major air engagements on terms favourable to the Allies, which would result in inflicting heavy losses on the Luftwaffe. Planning began in April 1943 with a target launch date of September 8. However, the process of cutting back on the scale of the plan began early. Allied leadership demanded this, due to the fact that there were fewer resources available than earlier in the war.[17]

75. Throughout the planning, some of the proposed actions made it clear that much of the allied leadership was especially naive about deception. "It was suggested at one point, for example, that when the invasion convoy returned to England without landing in France, the troops would be told that the assault had been cancelled because the German coastal defences were too strong. Not long after this was disapproved, it was proposed that after the STARKEY operation had been terminated, the press should be permitted to report that the invasion had not failed but was instead a deception, and close-up photographs of the decoy equipment would be made public. While the revelation of the failed deception…"[18] might have produced some benefits. However, good photography of the decoys could only have aided the Germans in showing the quality, or lack thereof, of allied mock-ups, hence facilitating future recognition of similar items. A series of 14 commando-type raids code-named FORFAR formed a sub-element of STARKEY. They were intended to appear as intelligence gathering missions in preparation for the notionally imminent cross-channel invasion of STARKEY. Some internal deception of friendly forces was also employed. For security reasons, the commandos were told their mission was to capture a German soldier assigned to coastal defence duties for interrogation. This ruse had a dual purpose. In the event of capture, the raiders could not be forced to reveal the deception if they knew nothing about it. Also, it was recognised that Allied troops' morale would probably have suffered if they had known their personal risk was merely to support a deception.

76. Only eight of the planned 14 raids were actually launched. Some of those are discussed below:

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17 Cruickshank, C., Deception in World War II, 1979, pp. 61-84

18 Ibid

a. FORFAR BEER made three attempts. The first turned back after sighting a German trawler. The second was aborted due to bad weather and the third terminated when the troops could not scale the cliffs of the French coast.

b. FORFAR DOG scaled the cliffs but could not penetrate the barbed wire defences. The raiding party cut out a small sample of barbed wire so as not to return empty handed.

c. FORFAR EASY landed but, failing to make contact with the enemy after an hour and a half, also clipped out a section of barbed wire and returned home.

d. FORFAR HOW could not land due to heavy surf.

e. FORFAR LOVE, a team of two-man canoes launched from a motor gunboat, spotted so much enemy activity they too aborted prior to landing.

77. In total, the FORFAR raids apparently went completely unnoticed by the Germans. They were conceived and executed on too limited scale. Even if one prisoner had been taken, it is probable the Germans would have viewed it as nothing more than harassment. To be effective, several landings would have been required at significantly separated locations. This would plausibly have indicated the covert survey of landing areas for an invasion. TINDALL was intended to portray an impending attack in the area of Stavanger, Norway. The objective was to freeze German forces in Scandinavia, rather than permitting their deployment to Europe or the Mediterranean. Again, this required considerable preparation in the display of physical resources needed for such an invasion. Airfield improvement and increased air defence, along with the display of decoy bombers and troop-carrying gliders and their tow planes, were undertaken at several airfields in Scotland. [19]

78. In general, TINDALL, too, was scaled down considerably from the initial concept. The required timing for exposure of the decoy aircraft and gliders to German intelligence was inadequate due to logistic problems. The soldiers that trained for the notional assault were so unconvinced themselves of the cover story that their loose talk may well have reached German intelligence.

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19 Ibid

79. WADHAM was intended to portray the story of a large-scale combined air and sea attack on the Brittany peninsula. The objective, again, was to freeze German forces in that area. In this case, American and British forces were involved in an assault planned for September 30, 1943. A prime objective was to capture Breast and implicitly neutralise its U-boat pens and those at Lorient and St. Nazaire.

80. A number of passive and active measures were involved. Leaks regarding troop strength, training and readiness, decoy aircraft and assault gliders, "planning leaks," and a short newsreel film titled 'Invasion Preparation at Fever Heat,' were the passive demonstrations of the deception.[20]

81. Active measures included actual bombing of the submarine pens and a less-than-convincing commando raid, code-named POUND.

82. The target was the Isle of Ushant. All this was intended to support the story that an intelligence sortie was attempting to determine the strength of defences in the area. The intended German prisoner was not taken and the visibility of the raid was limited to an exchange of gunfire with a German defensive position.

83. COCKADE and its sub-elements suffered from some fairly major deficiencies in the resources available for execution. The Germans' disdainful reaction may also be explained in terms other than poorly constructed deception. Two writers have indicated a major German intelligence success branded COCKADE as a hoax, when a July 29 transatlantic telephone call between Roosevelt and Churchill revealed that COCKADE was a trick. Although the call was presumed secured by the A-3 scrambler, the Germans had in fact broken that system by the fall of 1941. They had routinely monitored a broad spectrum of mid- and high-level voice communications.

84. The major cause of failure, however, was the total implausibility of an invasion of the continent at that stage of the war. The total picture of allied strength and preparations that the Germans gained was from sources so numerous that they could not all be totally manipulated or controlled. Evidence showed clearly that such an attack was unrealistic in 1943.

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20 Ibid.

ACCUMULATOR

85. The fifth example is a tactical deception that occurred later in World War II in support of OVERLORD, the invasion of France. It can be classified as a technical failure as well. It failed because of inadequate planning, coordination, preparation and time, combined with some degree of bad luck. It was code-named ACCUMULATOR.

86. "In June 1944, seven days after D-Day, with the success of the landings still in doubt, it was decided to create a notional diversionary attack." [21]

87. Previous deception efforts, such as FORTITUDE, had concentrated on the French coast to the east of the Normandy area. However, ACCUMULATOR endeavoured to focus attention on the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. "The operation, conceived on very short notice, employed two Canadian destroyers, the Haida and the Huron, as platforms for electronic deception. They were to simulate an amphibious assault force to land on June 13, 1944, near the town of Granville. The deception consisted entirely of radio voice broadcasts. The initial transmission was in the clear, reporting to base that the speed of the fleet, located Southwest of the Island of Jersey, had been reduced due to engine trouble on one of the ships. A discussion of the revised plan of attack followed, also in the clear. However, an unknowing allied reconnaissance aircraft reported the two destroyers as 'unidentified warships.' Part way through the operation, the Haida abandoned the effort because her radios were not ready. This forced the Huron to continue a solo performance with a hastily revised transmission scenario. Although British War Office records reported the operation as satisfactory, no German reaction was observed." [22]

88. This failure was characterised by an apparent absence of the desired German force deployment away from the Normandy beaches, and toward the Cotentin Peninsula. This could have been due to the German intercept operators determining the actual nature of the force by monitoring reconnaissance aircraft reports. The unscheduled reporting was obviously the result of failed coordination of the operational aspects of the deception.

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21 Idem, pp. 200-201.

22 Ibid

89. The failure could also have been caused by the absence of the other aspects of an actual invasion fleet. Missing were the radar signatures of a large group of ships that would undoubtedly have been accompanied by air support and ECM. Deception story portrayals by one means have less credibility than stories portrayed over a number of means.

90. Also, by June 13 the magnitude of the Normandy force was clear to the German military leadership. Hitler apparently still believed an attack would come in the Pas de Calais area. This, combined with the general disorganisation in northern France, probably prevented any serious thought of a major shift of forces in the west.

IRONSIDE

91. The sixth example was code-named IRONSIDE. In early 1944, with the allied decision made to invade Normandy, the primary objective was to minimise opposition to the attacking force. This involved convincing the Germans to freeze their forces in place and, if possible, withdraw some from the Normandy area. An attack of southern France, code-named ANVIL, was intended to accomplish this objective. [23]

92. Final invasion decisions were to be made at the Cairo and Teheran conferences. By that time, the weight of American resources devoted to the war effort gave them de facto authority to take charge of the grand strategy. In spite of the wrangling and, at times, overt hostility, it was agreed that ANVIL/DRAGOON would proceed. It would be supported in the Mediterranean by several supporting deception operations: IRONSIDE, VENDETTA, and FERDINAND. All were made more difficult by the requirement to proceed after the actual Normandy landing. While none of the three were great successes, IRONSIDE is generally considered a failure.

93. "The (IRONSIDE) scenario included an almost totally notional series of actions:

a. At D+3 a brigade-sized force would capture the airfields at Medis and Cozes.

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23 Idem,p. 159

b. A division would establish a position between Le Verdon and Soulac.

c. A second division would attack at Arcachon to secure the main route to Bordeaux.

d. At some later time three more divisions would reinforce each beachhead and later advance along the Garonne River.

e. A large scale naval force, which was to provide transportation, mine sweeping, bombardment, and even aircraft carriers, was to participate."[24]

94. While the IRONSIDE concept was not unreasonable, it failed because of insufficient real evidence to make it plausible. No naval forces were available and air support was limited to reconnaissance.

ANZIO

95. "(The last example occurred)…Following SHINGLE, the successful Allied landing at Anzio, Italy, on January 22, 1944, (when) the Germans launched a strong but ineffective counter-attack along the Via Anziate without benefit of deception or surprise. Hitler attached great strategic importance to the Allied landing, which he viewed not only as the 'Battle for Rome' but the beginning of the invasion of Europe. He ordered Field Marshal Kesselring to mount a second counter-attack and vetoed the subsequent plan for a thrust between Isola Bells and Ponte della Crocetta as being too close to the previously unsuccessful route of approach. Instead, Hitler ordered the attack to fall between the Astura River and the Mussolini Canal. Kesselring and von Mackessen obeyed and scheduled demonstrations to simulate flanking attacks in the areas of Sessano and Ardea/Buonriposo."[25]

96. These demonstrations were unsuccessful because British intelligence was able to pierce the German deception attempts. The intent is not to dwell on failure

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24 Ibid

25 C.J.C. Molony et al, "The Meditteranean and Middle East," vol V, The Campaign in Scicily 1943 and the Campaign in Italy 3 September 1943 to 31 March 1944, pp. 724-754.

but, rather, to portray the immense scope of deception planning, the fragile nature of deception operations, and the absolute necessity for total integration of the deception effort into the decision-making process.

SECTION 4
APPLICATION TO MANOEUVRE WARFARE

GENERAL

97. Our ability to fight in accordance with our manoeuverist approach is enhanced by using battlefield deception. The effective use of deception allows us to take the initiative by doing the unexpected and inducing the enemy to react to our operations. Deception allows us to:

a. capitalize on frustrated, misaligned, and misallocated enemy operations and resources;

b. extend our operations deep into enemy rear operations; and

c. affect the mission of enemy reserve and echelon forces.

98. Synchronisation with the real mission is critical to successful battlefield deception operations.

99. Battlefield deception operations, by their very nature, imply taking calculated, prudent risks in order to gain the tactical and operational advantage over the enemy. Planned deceptions allow us to sequence the presentation of the battlefield to the enemy in the manner in which we wish him to view it. In the defensive, battlefield deception allows us to portray inaccurate dispositions and capabilities that hide our true weaknesses. This can effectively negate the enemy's choice of the time and place of battle.

100. In both the offence and defence, battlefield deception enhances the conditions that allow the friendly commander to effectively mass his forces at the decisive time and location on the battlefield. Successfully managed, deception operations give us the element of surprise over the enemy.

101. In the defence, this includes making the enemy attack where he perceives our weaknesses to be or gearing his intelligence activities toward notional rearward activities. We inject notional combat information and intelligence into his decision-

making process. This influences the outcome of his decisions and requires him to reconfirm information or dedicate additional intelligence resources toward our deceptive activity.

102. In the offence, battlefield deception assists our offensive spirit by giving our commanders freedom to develop a greater number of alternative courses of action. Deception operations induce the enemy to view the battlefield the way we want him to. This causes him to take actions favourable to and exploitable by friendly operations. Because of induced misperceptions of the battlefield, the enemy in the defence is not given time to identify the composition of our forces and mass his forces or supporting fires against the attack. Successfully planned and executed battlefield deceptions give our commanders the ability to act faster than the enemy can make decisions. Battlefield deception keeps the enemy reacting to false friendly dispositions, intentions or capabilities.

103. As with other imperatives for success on the battlefield, deceptions must be an integral part of the planning process. In order to optimise the desired effect upon the enemy, they must be synchronised with the true combat mission. These effects induce inappropriate focusing or diffusing of enemy combat power. They may cause the enemy to misperceive friendly capabilities and intentions in a manner that results in enemy actions that can be exploited. The former effect can create friendly advantages in terms of time, distance, location, force ratios, or mission mismatches. The latter creates friendly advantage primarily in terms of ensuring that inadequate time exists for enemy reaction to true operations, regardless of if or when they are discovered. Activities in all combat functions which have embedded deceptive intent within the operational plan, must be synchronised to achieve both operational and deception objectives.

104. Battlefield deception, as with other operations, must be flexible and continuously synchronised with the changing friendly and enemy situations. Synchronising deception activities with true actions, or with the desired enemy perception, provides our commander with a mean to achieve economy of force.

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

105. Battlefield deception is an important element of the command and control warfare (C2W) strategy. An enemy's ability to perceive and manage the battlefield with clarity and certainty accents the importance of planning and integrating a C2W strategy into our operations. Battlefield deception is employed in concert with the four other components of C2W:

a. Electronic Warfare (EW);

b. Operations Security (OPSEC);

c. Psychological Operation (PSYOPS); and

d. Physical destruction.

106. This combination is designed to influence, degrade, or destroy enemy command capabilities while protecting friendly command capabilities from similar enemy efforts. The successful attack of adversary command and control systems requires an integrated application of all available assets. Battlefield deception complements the other components of offensive and defensive C2W. In countering enemy command capabilities battlefield deception can be used to inject false truths into the enemy's decision-making process. These false truths will distort his ability to respond to the true current situation. This is accomplished by many means including portraying false friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions, which can cause the enemy to:

a. mass or disperse;

b. hold in place, commit, or commit either prematurely or too late;

c. adopt inappropriate force configurations; and/or

d. adopt a style of manoeuvre inappropriate to friendly operations.

107. Furthermore, electronic and obscurant-based means of battlefield deception can result in false target and situation data being developed by the enemy. In both of these examples, we can effectively:

a. degrade the enemy's Command capabilities;

b. make him question his intelligence collection and analysis apparatus; and/or

c. induce incorrect manoeuvre, force allocation and sustainment decisions.

108. Battlefield deception can also assist in the protection of our own command and control system. For example, deception operations can nullify or degrade the

enemy's target acquisition and offensive capabilities by causing him to diffuse his firepower or to commit manoeuvre assets at inappropriate times and locations. Deception also assists the operational security posture of the operation by masking indicators of true intent.

SECTION 5
CORNERSTONES OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION

INTRODUCTION

109. Commanders must thoroughly understand and apply several important cornerstones for the development of successful battlefield deception operations. These considerations fall into three broad areas: intelligence and counter-intelligence, integration and synchronisation, and OPSEC.

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

110. The threat of enemy intelligence and combat operations reinforces the importance of using our intelligence estimates to develop operational and tactical plans as well as our counter-intelligence capability to gather information on the enemy intelligence capabilities and beliefs and on the effect of our deception activities. Battlefield deception operations rely extensively on the same level of timely and accurate intelligence as do combat operations including the requirement to understand, monitor and forecast the enemy information operation activities. To ensure that friendly operations are viewed by the enemy as plausible, and subsequently authentic, we need to know:

a. how the enemy decision and intelligence cycles operate;

b. what type of deceptive information he is likely to accept;

c. what source he relies on to get his intelligence:

d. what he needs to confirm this information; and

e. what latitude he has in modifying or changing an on-going or planned operation.

111. To answer these questions, battlefield deception planners require extensive intelligence support during the planning, execution, and evaluation stages of an operation. Furthermore, constant feedback on the enemy's acceptance of our deception is required in order to maintain flexibility and economy of forces.

INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

112. Once we have determined where the enemy is susceptible to battlefield deception and what the objective of our deception will be, we must begin to integrate and synchronise deception operations and events into our true operation. This underlines the importance of planning and executing deceptions as part of the planning and execution of our true operations. There should be no such thing as a deception planned separately from the true operation.

113. History has shown that the deceptions that stand the greatest chance of being accepted as our true capabilities, intentions or dispositions are deceptions that are:

a. flexible;

b. doctrinally consistent with our actual capabilities and intentions;

c. credible as to current battlefield situations; and

d. simple enough not to get confused during the heat of battle.

114. Synchronisation of deception operations with true operations must include the centralised control over the timing, scheduling, and execution. Successful battlefield deception operations will require, in many cases, the commitment of actual combat, combat support, support services and command resources. Deceptions are an operational responsibility. The commander must be willing to task the appropriate assets to make the deception plan work. The more realistic and doctrinally consistent combined arms deception operations are, the greater the probability of the enemy perceiving them as plausible.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

115. OPSEC is another integral aspect of overall combat operations. OPSEC and deception are mutually supporting activities. OPSEC supports deception by eliminating or reducing the indicators that give away our true intentions or display our

deceptive intent. Deception can produce signatures behind which our true operations may hide. In general, given that the primary aim of deception is to influence the enemy commander, OPSEC establishes the base of secrecy that is necessary for battlefield deceptions to be successful. OPSEC gives us the capability to look at ourselves in order to identify our vulnerabilities and the profiles that we present to the enemy. If battlefield deceptions are to be used to gain surprise over the enemy, It is essential that our unit's true intentions, dispositions and capabilities be concealed, manipulated, distorted as well as falsified. OPSEC is essential to all successful deception.

116. OPSEC is not an administrative security program. OPSEC is used to influence enemy decisions by concealing specific, operationally significant information from his intelligence collection assets. OPSEC provides concealment for all deceptions, affecting both the plan and how it is executed.

SURPRISE AND SECURITY

117. Deception, employed properly, can help create surprise, thereby significantly enhancing the commander's opportunity for success.

118. Battlefield deception can be used prior to or during hostilities. The military commander is confronted with achieving surprise over the enemy by maintaining security. It is not essential that the enemy is taken totally unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively.

119. The key to successful deception is security. It is possible to hide the real and portray the false, but without good indicator security, the real operation and the supporting deception operations are at risk.

DOCTRINE

120. We must assume that any potential enemy will be well versed in NATO, US and Canadian doctrine. He will expect our units to behave in certain ways, and if we stray too far his intelligence analysts will question our conduct. Deceptions must be consistent with doctrinal norms and how units apply those norms in combat.

121. If the enemy's perception of our doctrine is different from the doctrine itself, we ought to play on his perception of the doctrine. The successful deception planner

is the one who approaches the problem by putting himself in the enemy's shoes and developing a story believable from this vantagepoint.

PATTERNS

122. Patterns are procedural indicators that give a unit an operational profile, how units execute doctrine. Enemy analysts use these patterns to identify the unit and predict its intentions. Once the enemy notes a pattern in the unit's activities, he expects to continue seeing that pattern. As changes in the pattern lead the enemy to question friendly activity, it is important to use established friendly patterns in the deception.

123. Since we are often unaware of the patterns we have established, it is difficult to ensure that the required profile detail is present. OPSEC surveys are specifically designed to provide such information. We can achieve the desired operational plausibility by ensuring that planners develop deceptions as if they were genuine operations.

124. A commander who really plans to feint left and conduct the main attack on the right might initially direct his units to plan for a simultaneous attack. During the attack preparations, subordinate unit staffs would execute their normal patterns for this action. When appropriate, the commander could change his order to the appropriate unit and direct the conduct of a feint only. An imaginative planner might find other ways to display established patterns to the enemy. It is important that the enemy sees what he expects to see.

125. Another approach could be to deliberately create patterns in our deception plans. Repeated employment of a particular deception technique or measure will certainly establish a telltale pattern. Variety and creativity are vital to continued success. Battlefield deception planners must ensure that neither they nor their plans become too predictable.

FACTORS

126. The following factors of deception are taken from previous operations. They should be carefully considered in planning deception activities. They are as valuable today as they were when the Greeks placed the wooden horse before the walls of Troy.

a. **Policy**. Deception is never conducted as an end in itself. It must support real plans, operations, and objectives.

b. **Objective**. A specific, realistic, clearly defined objective is an absolute necessity. All deception actions must contribute to the accomplishment of the objective.

c. **Planning**. Deception should be addressed in the commander's initial guidance to his staff. Deception planners must have full and continuous access to, and participate in, staff deliberations in order to fully understand and support ongoing planning. Deception planners should be knowledgeable about the operational planning process and current operations. Possibilities for achieving deception should be considered in the estimate process during formulation of alternative courses of action. Non-deception planners should be consulted for their expertise as well.

d. **Coordination**. There must be close coordination between the deception plan and the corresponding operations plan. Deception activities must be coordinated with other agencies and commands that support the operation and/or may be impacted by the deception. Any unit that could inadvertently compromise an operation through normal actions must also be contacted or controlled.

e. **Timing**. Sufficient time must be allowed to:

(1) complete deception planning in an orderly manner;

(2) effect necessary coordination;

(3) promulgate tasks to involved units;

(4) present the deception story to the enemy decision-maker through his intelligence system; and

(5) permit the enemy decision-maker to react in the desired way to pursue a desired course of action.

f. **Security**. Stringent security is mandatory. The true situation or plan must not be revealed to the enemy. Friendly forces not involved or concerned must not be aware of the deception. Limited

access and other appropriate measures must protect the specifics of a deception operation. While the need for strict security must be maintained, security restrictions should not impede timely planning, coordination, and the execution of operations.

g. **Realism**. All deceptive information provided to the enemy must be realistic.

h. **Flexibility**. The ability to react rapidly to changes in the situation and to modify deceptive action is mandatory.

i. **Intelligence**. Deception must be based on the best estimates of the enemy's intelligence collection resources, his decision-making process, and probable intentions and reactions.

j. **Enemy Capabilities**. The enemy decision-maker must be able to execute the action desired.

k. **Friendly Forces' Capabilities**. Capabilities of friendly forces as depicted in the deception operation must match the enemy's estimates. The deception must be conducted without unacceptable degradation of friendly capabilities.

l. **Forces and Personnel**. Real forces and personnel required to implement the deception plan must be identified. Notional forces must be realistically portrayed.

m. **Means**. Deception must be conveyed through all feasible and available means.

n. **Supervision**. The deception planner must continually supervise planning and execution of a deception operation (See Annex A). All actions must be correlated with the objective and implemented at the proper time.

o. **Liaison**. Constant liaison must be maintained with plans, operations, intelligence, communications and other appropriate staff personnel to ensure they are aware of the advantage of deception and available to assist in planning and executing such operations.

p. **Feedback**. A reliable method of feedback should exist to gage enemy reaction to the deception. Accurate feedback increases the chances for success in deception operations. Timely intelligence support is critical to obtaining feedback. Feedback may not be direct or immediate, especially in complex situations. However, the advantages to be gained certainly require that deception planners strive for good feedback.

TRAINING

127. Training in battlefield deception offers added benefits to commanders. The brainstorming associated with developing a workable deception plan causes a greater appreciation for enemy tactics, strengths, weaknesses and capabilities. This process also encourages more thoughtful and imaginative approaches to friendly doctrine and habits. Deception training contributes to our understanding of:

a. what we look like to the human eye, the camera and electronic devices;

b. what we look like under specific conditions;

c. how long it takes us to undertake specific tasks; and

d. the type of indicators the enemy looks for to determine our capabilities and intentions.

128. Adequate training must be conducted in order to master the techniques of deception. In applying deception to field training exercises, the following elements are necessary:

a. The unit must train for an operation within a scenario that allows the commander to elect deception or the superior tactical headquarters to direct it.

b. There must be sufficient manoeuvre room and training time to permit several options to be analysed as possible deception stories.

c. There must be an opposing surveillance system available to gage the proficiency achieved.

129. The projection of the measures (false indicators) and the counter surveillance actions to conceal movements and dispositions need to be analysed to determine the success of the training exercise.

130. Wars are fought with skills learned through schooling, exercises, operational experience, and self-study. Because of various necessary artificiality, peacetime schooling and exercises tend to lose sight of some of the harsh lessons of war. The essential need for secrecy and information control in war; are among the lessons often forgotten. Deception will work on the battlefield only if it has been practised in training.

131. In future wars, it is unlikely that there will be time to relearn history's lessons after fighting begins. The initial engagements may decide the outcome of the war. Developing Army training programs will help ensure those lessons are learned during peacetime.

SECTION 6
COMPONENTS OF BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

132. Battlefield deceptions are planned in a manner similar to the planning of standard combat operations; each component of deception is applicable at operational and tactical levels, but varies in scope. The components of battlefield deception are objectives, target, story, plan, and events.

OBJECTIVES

133. The deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation. It is presented as a mission statement. The objective specifies what action or lack of action the enemy must be made to take at a specific place or time on the battlefield as a direct result of the friendly deception operation. Deception objectives relate directly to inappropriate actions and responses that we want the enemy to take. These actions can then be exploited by friendly operations.

TARGET

134. The target of battlefield deception operations is the enemy decision-maker. He has the authority to make the decision that will execute the deception objective desired by the friendly commander. Battlefield deception targeting can occur in two ways:

a. the enemy decision-maker may be personally targeted with deception operations if his behaviour patterns are known and predictable; and

b. the enemy commander may be doctrinally targeted if the deceiver does not know the enemy decision-maker's behaviour patterns.

135. The deceiver will then focus on the intelligence collection and decision cycle processes as these provide the information on which pre-judgement and decisions are made.

STORY

136. The deception story is the friendly intention, capability, or disposition that the enemy is to be made to believe.

PLAN

137. The deception plan outlines which specific operations, displays or secrets must be used to convey the deception story to the target. It takes the form of an operation plan or order, which is included in the deception annex. The most important deception tasks contained in the deception annex should be moved to the execution paragraph of the overall plan or order and the relevant tasks to other supporting annexes.

EVENTS

138. Deception events are friendly indicators and actions that present specific parts of the total deception story to the enemy's intelligence sensors. Some deception events, given the enemy and friendly situation, can be described as non-action or delayed-action in nature. An example would be delaying the movement forward of

logistic bases or artillery support until shortly before a deliberate attack. The table of Figure 1-2 shows the difference in scope of the deception components at various levels of deception employment.

Deception Component	**Theatre**	**Corps**	**Division or Brigade Group**
Objective Cause inappropriate enemy reaction to friendly	Actions in communication zone Orientation and disposition of major forces Far and deep intent Behind enemy line activities Special weapons	Action in Corps rear area Manoeuvre of divisions Corps deep intent Special weapon	Tactical intent Manoeuvre of troops Close, Rear and Deep Operations
Target The enemy commander controlling	Strategic level weapons Front or strategic reserves Special Forces	Front, Army or Corps operations Corps, Army or Front Reserves Army or Corps second echelon forces	Division, and Army or Corps troops operations Second echelon divisional forces Divisional reserve
Story	Longer period for enemy processing Present theatre capabilities, doctrine and intentions Joint and Combined operations Strategic intent	Formulated in operational campaign and mission planning May by received from Theatre Enhance capability to perform the mission in the Corps Area of Operation	Normally received by Corps Portray capabilities, augmentation or intention Normally not an independent operation

Event	Broad in scope Use of Alliance, National Joint and combined operations	Executed by Corps assets Planned and limited execution by unit assigned specific deception function	Executed by organic and assigned assets Portray capabilities, augmentation or intention Normally not an independent operation Planned and limited execution by unit assigned specific deception function
Plan	Developed by theatre staff Executed by Corps and subordinate formation Use Alliance Theatre, National, Joint and Combined assets	Developed by Corps deception element May integrate deception task into the supporting and subordinate units without reference to the deception intent (Deception intent provided in the deception annex only)	Developed by formation deception element May be tasked to supporting and subordinate units without reference to the deception intent (Deception intent provided in the deception annex only)

Figure 1-2: Deception Component Purpose by Level of Command

SECTION 7
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

139. Deception operations are constrained, but not forbidden, by international agreements. Ruses of war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered permissible. The following rule should be observed in respect to the provisions of the law of armed conflict.

140. Absolute good faith with the enemy must be observed as a rule of conduct. But this does not prevent measures such as using spies and secret agents, encouraging defection or insurrection among the enemy civilian population, corrupting enemy civilians or soldiers by bribes, or inducing enemy soldiers to desert, surrender, or rebel. In general, a belligerent may resort to those measures for mystifying or misleading the enemy against which the enemy ought to take measures to protect himself.

141. Ruses of war are legitimate so long as they do not involve treachery or perfidy on the part of the belligerent resorting to them. They are, however, forbidden if they contravene any generally accepted rule.

ILLIGITIMATE RUSES

142. The line of demarcation between legitimate ruses and forbidden acts or perfidy is sometimes indistinct. The following examples illustrate gaining an advantage over the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading conduct which involves a breach of faith, or when there is a moral obligation to speak the truth. For example, it is improper to feign surrender so as to secure an advantage over an opposing force. Similarly, to broadcast to the enemy that an armistice had been agreed upon when such is not the case would be treacherous. On the other hand, it is a perfectly proper ruse to summon a force to surrender on the ground that it is surrounded and thereby induce such surrender with a small force.

143. The other forbids Treacherous or perfidious conduct in war because it destroys the basis for a restoration of peace short of the complete annihilation of one belligerent.

144. It is especially forbidden to make improper use of a flag of truce, the national flag, the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.

145. Flags of truce must not be used surreptitiously to obtain military information or merely to obtain time to effect a retreat or secure reinforcements, or to feign a surrender in order to surprise an enemy. In practice, it has been authorised to make use of national flags, insignia, and uniforms as a ruse. The foregoing rule (Hague Regulation (HR), Article 23, paragraph F of Treaty Series 539) does not prohibit such employment but does prohibit their improper use. It is certainly forbidden to employ them during combat, but their use at other times is not forbidden.

146. The use of the emblem of the Red Cross and other equivalent insignia must be limited to indication or protection of medical units and establishments and the personnel and material protected by GWS and other similar conventions. The following are examples of the improper use of the emblem:

a. using a hospital, or other building accorded such protection, as an observation post or military office or depot;

b. firing from a building or tent displaying the emblem of the Red Cross;

c. using a hospital train or aircraft to facilitate the escape of combatants;

d. displaying the emblem on vehicles containing ammunition or other non-medical stores; and

e. in general using it for cloaking acts of hostility.

LIGITIMATE RUSES

147. Legitimate ruses include the following: surprises, ambushes, feigning attacks, retreats or flights, simulating quiet and inactivity, use of small forces to simulate large unit, transmitting false or misleading radio or telephone messages, deception of the enemy by bogus orders purporting to

have been issued by the enemy commander, making use of the enemy's signals and passwords, pretending to communicate with troops or reinforcement which have no existence. Also, deceptive supply movements, deliberate planting of false information, use of spies and secret agents, moving landmarks, putting up dummy guns and vehicles or laying dummy mines, erecting dummy installations and airfields, removing unit identifications from uniforms, use of signal deceptive measures, and psychological warfare activities.

CHAPTER 2
BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

"Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honourable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force."

Machiavelli, The Discourses

GENERAL

1. Operational-level deceptions are within the purview of Theatre Army component, Army group, field Army, and in some cases, corps commanders. The objective of deception operations at the operational level of war is to influence the decisions of enemy commanders before battle occurs. This is done so that the tactical outcome of battles and engagements is favourable and, subsequently, operationally exploitable. The goal is to maintain operational fluidity. For this reason operational deceptions have a much larger potential payoff than those do at the tactical level.

2. These echelons of command may have operational or logistic sustainment or a combination of both types of mission responsibilities. During peacetime, the unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is organised, equipped, trained and maintained, directly contribute to:

a. the strategic aim of managing crisis's; and

b. if deterrence fails, the operational requirement to win campaigns and major operations.

3. During peacetime and conflict periods, the unit's true and deceptive efforts concerning how the force is allocated and sustained, directly contribute to:

a. delaying final enemy war waging decisions so that political intervention or war-avoidance processes can be engaged; and

b. if political intervention fails, the operational requirement to induce the enemy to revisit his already-made force allocation and sustainment decisions.

CENTER OF GRAVITY

4. The essence of operational art is the identification of the enemy's centre of gravity and the design of campaigns that expose it to attack and destruction. Enemy operational centres of gravity can be a function of the political, economic, military, sociological, ideological, or psychological context (or combinations thereof) which give rise to the presence of the enemy. Operational centres of gravity have been characterised as:

a. the mass of the enemy force;

b. the boundaries between two major enemies combat formations;

c. vital command and control centres;

d. vital logistic bases;

e. cohesion among enemy alliances; and

f. mental or psychological balance of a key commander.

5. A centre of gravity is a fundamental source of enemy power and strength, and, in most cases, it will have to be attacked in phases over time. A campaign plan's ultimate objective should be the destruction of the enemy's centre of gravity. Deceptions supporting the campaign plan should be consciously designed to expose the enemy's centre of gravity to increasingly higher levels of risk. Deceptions that are developed around branches and sequels to campaigns and major operations plans weaken the robustness with which the enemy can preserve his centre of gravity.

LINES OF OPERATION

6. Lines of operation define the direction of a force in relation to the enemy. Multiple lines of operation in a campaign are not uncommon, although there is usually only one per campaign or major operation. This

line, or lines, connects the friendly operational base or bases geographically with the operational objective. By manipulating these lines, it is possible to mislead the enemy and cause him to adopt inappropriate courses of action (see Figure 2-1).



Figure 2-1: Operational base and objective relationship.

CULMINATING POINTS

7. All offensive operations reach a point--the culminating point--when the strength of the attacker no longer decisively exceeds that of the defender. Continuing to operate beyond that point risks over-extension, counterattack, and defeat. The aim of attack is to achieve decisive objectives before reaching the culminating point.

8. While on the attack, deception operations make it easier to move supplies forward and to preserve:

a. available stocks;

b. numerical advantage of the attacking force;

c. reserve forces; and

d. local air superiority.

9. Offensive deception operations can take the form of displays, feints, or demonstrations (which reduce enemy manoeuvre or fire-induced force attrition), or a combination thereof. All contribute to delaying premature achievement of friendly culminating points. Operational commanders who are attacking can manipulate the indicators that the enemy commander uses to perceive friendly culminating points. This can induce the enemy to:

a. miscalculate which major operation is the main effort (where the decisive battle is sought);

b. miscalculate which branch of the major operation is then assuming main effort emphasis;

c. miscalculate post-battle disposition, objectives, and missions;

d. prematurely shift to the offensive;

e. prematurely commit reserves;

f. hold forces in reserve too long;

g. adopt hasty defensive postures;

h. be logistically under-prepared for the impending battle;

i. inappropriately over-weight a sector logistically, or with fire support, where a decision is not sought; and

j. inappropriately exhaust or withhold enemy close air support or battlefield interdiction sorties.

10. Defence hastens culmination of the enemy attack, and then exploits it offensively. While on the defensive, deception operations are employed to:

a. induce the allocation of numerically inferior forces to the offensive (feign or demonstrate weakness);

b. dilute the enemy's ability to concentrate his main effort with fires and manoeuvres (notionally threaten his flanks and rear areas); and

c. through notional means, canalise enemy movement into killing zones.

OPERATIONAL DECEPTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

11. Operational commanders plan and execute campaigns and major operations that extend from ports and support areas far to the rear of the line of contact to similarly distant sources of enemy support. They concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerabilities at decisive times and places. These commanders set the terms of battle, which will be fought by subordinate units, by synchronising:

a. ground force movement of corps, field armies, and Army groups;

b. air force close air support, counter-air, and battlefield interdiction efforts;

c. logistic sustainment activities;

d. rear, close, and deep operations, whether offensive or defensive in nature; and

e. where appropriate naval activities.

12. The operational commander is the catalyst who converts strategic ends into operational means--campaigns and major operations--to accomplish the ends. He focuses on executing the campaign plan by staging, conducting, and exploiting the outcome of major operations. Campaign plans set long-term goals that are accomplished in phases in most cases. Depending on what the enemy centre of gravity is, they can be designed to defeat the enemy in a number of different ways, such as:

a. physically destroying enemy forces;

b. defeating or depriving the enemy of his allies;

c. separating his armies in the field for piecemeal defeat;

d. preventing enemy deployment;

e. destroying enemy logistic support;

f. occupying decisive terrain, which forces battle on terrain unfavourable to the enemy; and

g. carrying the war into the enemy homeland.

CAMPAIGN PLANS

13. The plan for the first phase of the campaign depicts the commander's intent, allocates forces to major subordinate units, disposes the forces for operations, and coordinates air and naval support for ground manoeuvre. Employing deception during the first phase of a campaign affords operational commanders ample opportunities to:

a. Influence enemy perception of friendly operational intent (objectives), and by extension, strategic ends.

b. Induce incorrect enemy conclusions and decisions about friendly forces being allocated to fight the battle.

c. Induce incorrect enemy conclusions about force dispositions.

d. Induce incorrect enemy conclusions about the nature and extent of air and naval support to the ground manoeuvre.

14. All this is done to predispose the enemy to adopt a posture that is operationally exploitable in the first as well as upcoming battles. Planned branches to the campaign plan, options for changing dispositions, orientation, direction of movement, and decisions to accept or decline battle, are the fertile soil into which the seeds of deception can be sown. Sequels establish dispositions, objectives, and missions for subordinate units after battle. Planned sequels allow effective transition to exploitation, counter-offensive, withdrawal, retreat, or reorientation of the main effort.

Deceptions can be as effectively woven around planned sequel variants as branch variants (see Figure 2-2).



Figure 2-2: Uses of branches and sequels as deceptions.

DECEPTION SUSTAINMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION

15. Operational sustainment provides support by:

a. manning the force with leaders and soldiers;

b. arming the force with weapon systems and munitions;

c. fuelling the force with supplies;

d. fixing or replacing damaged or destroyed materiel; transporting the supported force; and

e. protecting the sustainment system from degradation or destruction.

16. The following sustainment imperatives facilitate the sustainment function:

a. anticipation,

b. integration,

c. continuity,

d. responsiveness,

e. improvisation, and

f. lines of support.

ANTICIPATION

17. Operational sustainment planners must ensure that base facilities, priorities of support, lines of communication (L of C), and troop movements support the main lines of operation. They must also be robust enough to postpone attainment of the culminating point until after the friendly decision point is reached, in anticipation of attacks by enemy:

a. agents and sympathisers;

b. special forces;

c. point and area deep attack systems (air and/or ground);

d. airborne forces;

e. airmobile forces; and

f. ground manoeuvre (exploitation) forces.

18. Operational sustainment planners should create notional base facilities and establish and use notional L of C.

INTEGRATION

19. Integration of operational and sustainment deception plans will result in the anticipatory sustainment requirements, mentioned earlier, being satisfied within the context of planned branches and sequels to campaign and major operations plans.

CONTINUITY

20. By satisfying the integration requirement mentioned earlier, operational continuity (in terms of lines of operations and culminating points) will be enhanced.

RESPONSIVENESS

21. Deceptive dilution of the sustainment system, through the use of notional logistic bases and L of C, preserve the robustness of the system during surge periods needed to reconstitute the defence or to exploit offensive successes.

IMPROVISATION

22. The key imperative to sustaining the force is the imagination of everyone involved in the sustainment system to improvise using organic and, where possible, host nation resources. For example, notional sustainment nodes can be created from discarded empty containers or materiel.

LINES OF SUPPORT

23. Creation and manipulation of both central and multiple bases of support, in conjunction with interior and exterior lines of support, are the means with which the sustainment system is deceptively enhanced.

OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

24. The key to success in offensive campaigns is to defeat the enemy before reaching your culminating point--the point where the offence becomes exhausted. Unfortunately, culminating points are often reached before the decisive objective has been achieved, for one or more of the following reasons,:

a. Successive battles and engagements result in attrition of the force.

b. Forces are allocated to the flanks, reducing numerical advantage at the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

c. Supply lines become more extended and thus more fragile to interdiction, taking more time for supplies to reach the front.

d. Significant rear area threats require the commitment of forces away from the main effort.

e. Enemy defences may stiffen, as outer defensive belts are breached, causing further attrition of forces and the use of more supplies.

f. The natural friction of war and the sheer physical effort necessary to move and sustain forces work against maintenance of offensive momentum.

25. To prevent reaching the culminating point at the wrong time--before the objective is secured, the attacker must cause the enemy defence to collapse as rapidly as possible. He must simultaneously protect his forces and sustainment system. Operational commanders should employ deception in offensive campaigns to:

a. Mask the intentions of operational and sustainment forces.

b. Put the defender into positions of decisive disadvantage before battles and subordinate units join engagements.

c. Put the defender into positions of disadvantage so that the outcomes of battle (success, stalemate or defeat) can be exploited by operational reserves.

26. The reasons for employing deception go to the heart of maintaining operational fluidity. Deception is employed to:

a. preserve the initiative;

b. induce and strike enemy weaknesses;

c. induce the enemy to expose his in-depth formations to facilitate deep attack; and

d. prevent the enemy from establishing a coherent defence.

27. Offensive campaigns may be fought against concentrated or dispersed enemy forces. Against concentrated enemy forces, operational deception should induce the enemy to abandon his positions and fight at a positional disadvantage. This means:

a. Directing operations against enemy flanks or rear, while demonstrating or feigning a frontal main effort.

b. Penetrating weak areas of the defence, while demonstrating or feigning against flanks and rear.

c. Operating on converging exterior lines of operation, while demonstrating or feigning the use of interior lines.

28. Against dispersed enemy forces, operational deception should induce the enemy to remain dispersed for piecemeal defeat by:

a. Deceptively manipulating the sequencing of campaign branches and sequels so that enemy reserves do not decisively influence current battle outcomes.

b. Deceptively manipulating LOC and lines of operations so that notional convergence occurs at multiple objectives at the same time.

c. Feigning or demonstrating forms of manoeuvre that facilitate penetration of the attacking force into enemy rear areas of operations.

29. General Grant's Vicksburg Campaign during the Civil War graphically depicts the use of deception against both concentrated (Vicksburg) and dispersed (Vicksburg-Jackson) forces. Grant used demonstrations and feints north of Vicksburg to mask his manoeuvre south around Roundaway and Vidal bayous, and up the Big Black River. This phase of the campaign turned the southern flank of the Vicksburg defences and exposed the rear (the town of Jackson) to attack. By demonstrating and

feigning south of the Vicksburg defences, extending east from Warrenton toward the Big Black River, rebel forces at Vicksburg were effectively held in place. By demonstrating east to Jackson, rebel forces there were held in place as well. This tactic allowed Grant to:

a. Manoeuvre (interdict) against the Vicksburg defender's supply L of C in the general vicinity of Champion Hill.

b. Keep the Vicksburg and Jackson forces from massing.

c. Subsequently defeat by piecemeal the Vicksburg and Jackson defenders.

DEFENSIVE CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

30. The key to success in defensive campaigns is to destroy the enemy's capability to sustain forward movement--to hasten his culminating point. Defensive campaigns are undertaken:

a. when the military situation does not allow for offensive operations; or

b. when commanders must economise to support attacks elsewhere.

31. Defensive campaigns must control the enemy's attack, while simultaneously preserving the defending force's ability to defend and to assume offensive operations. Commanders mix defensive and offensive battles and engagements.They contest the initiative at every opportune time and place, within the area of operations, to exhaust the enemy attack. Operational commanders should employ deception in defensive campaigns to:

a. exploit enemy pre-battle force allocation and sustainment decisions;

b. exploit the potential for favourable outcomes of protracted minor battles fought by subordinate units;

c. lure the enemy into friendly territory, exposing his flanks and rear to attacks; and

d. mask the aggressiveness of the sustaining and operational forces committed to the defence.

32. The reasons for employing deception go to the heart of maintaining a coherent defence. Those reasons are to:

a. defeat a large attacking force;

b. retain territory; or

c. gain time.

33. Defensive campaigns, like offensive campaigns, contain branches and sequels that give the commander opportunities to exploit the military situation. It is around these branches and sequels that deception potentials exist.

34. Specific deceptive actions that the operational commander can take to hasten exhaustion of the enemy offensive include, but are not limited to:

a. Manipulating the size, action, location, unit, time and equipment factors associated with defensive dispositions.

b. Creating notional obstacles.

c. Masking the conditions under which he will accept decisive battle.

d. Manipulating the size, action, location, unit, time and equipment factors associated with operational reserves, particularly their mission intent.

e. Luring the enemy into a decisive battle, the outcome of which will precondition branching or sequencing to an offensive campaign.

f. Inducing enemy operational reserves to remain uncommitted at the decisive time or place.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRATEGETIC OPERATIONAL AND DECPTION PLANS

35. Strategic deception plans are designed to facilitate war fighting, escalation control and war winning at theatre level and higher. Operational deception plans facilitate the successful conduct of in-theatre campaigns at Army echelon above corps. Although echelon above corps organisations are not precluded from developing operational-level deceptions independent of the strategic context, they usually will be land component-specific, derivative slices of strategic deception plans.

36. Campaign plans and operational deception plans must not be developed in strategic plan vacuums for the following reasons:

a. Strategic deception plans are designed to have long–term effects on the enemy's ability to prosecute the war. They directly influence those enemy factors from which Army campaign plans are designed to set the terms of battle. Therefore, operational deceptions should be constantly maintained to respond to strategically induced evolutions in fundamental enemy battlefield capabilities.

b. Strategic deception plans must contain deception event tasking for one or more service components operating in the same theatre. Strategic and Army operational deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated at the strategic level to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes with one another.

c. Strategic deception plans might call for one service component to provide support to another component to satisfy the latter's strategic deception-related tasking. Army operational deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes with one another.

d. Strategic deception plans may require that some deception tasks be subordinated for execution through Army operational echelons down to Army tactical echelons.

e. Other-theatre deception plans may directly or indirectly influence Army echelon above corps organisations to set the terms of battle their tactical formations may have to deal with. Army echelon above corps organisations do not normally know about potential other-theatre impacts on their ability to wage campaigns. Army operational commanders, therefore, must look to the commander in chief to ensure that inter-theatre coordination occurs.

37. Strategic deception may influence the enemy's total capability to wage war in-theatre. Operational deceptions, taking the enemy's induced war-waging capability into account, set the terms of battle for tactical formations (see Figure 2-3).



Figure 2-3: Relationship between strategic and operational deception plans.

DECEPTION IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

38. Canadian Forces must be prepared to participate in deception activities in combined operations. Operational-level deception planning in combined theatre will be the norm. It, however, imposes these special considerations for the deception planner:

a. Combined military effectiveness and cohesion are functions of the political will of all nations involved in maintaining the coalition. (There may exist political

proscriptions against, or constraints on, the employment of deception.).

b. Political and military objectives among the Allies may differ. This directly impacts on:

(1) Who can be targets of deception?

(2) What deception objectives are politically affordable?

(3) What deception perceptions can be created?

(4) What channels can be used to portray the story to the enemy?

(5) What means can be used to execute deception plans?

c. Differences in deception capabilities (concepts, doctrine, training, force structure, materiel, etc) will require tailored planning, coordination, and liaison.

39. As with regular operations, the following are the chief considerations in planning and conducting combined deceptions:

a. command and control,

b. intelligence,

c. operational procedures, and

d. sustainment.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

40. Unity of command is essential in all wartime operations. The commander responsible for the operation is also responsible for its accompanying deceptions. The dedicated trained deception liaison officers are required through operations channels. Theses deception liaison officer

are necessary to ensure that deception information is kept segregated from current operations and plans in order to meet the OPSEC needs of our allies.

INTELLIGENCE

41. During war, national intelligence products relating to deceptions must be shared. Deception-specific Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR) and Information Requirement (IR) must be coordinated. Combined feedback mechanisms and procedures should be established. Arrangements must be made to ensure the rapid dissemination of intelligence for the use of multinational assets and capabilities that may be used to portray the deception story. Some of those are:

a. rumours,

b. newspapers,

c. military communications and non-communications emissions,

d. public radio,

e. diplomats,

f. false documents, and.

g. agents.

42. Combined intelligence staffs, or the use of liaison and exchange officers, contribute to the focussing of intelligence systems of all nations towards the deception effort.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

43. The design process for combined deception should maximise the use of allied capabilities and minimise individual and collective deficiencies.

44. SOPs should be established to integrate deception planning into the combined mission planning process.

45. The planning of campaigns and major operations include branches and sequels, which are deceptive in nature. This requires particular attention to the organic and improvised capabilities of allied units to display, demonstrate, and feign. The disparities that combined deception planners must take into account include:

a. deception control measures;

b. operational styles and tactics;

c. deception-specific organisations and equipment; and

d. multi-spectral (technical) signatures resulting from different weapons, radios, vehicles, and other materiel, and the different operational procedures that give operational fidelity to technically based replications.

46. The use of deception-specific liaisons, equipment exchanges, and combined deception training programs can help overcome some of these disparities before war breaks out.

SUSTAINMENT

47. Although sustainment is normally a national responsibility, augmented with lead nation capabilities, combined forces commanders will have to take those measures necessary to preserve the robustness and survivability of supporting sustainment systems. Deceptive uses and protection of these capabilities should be planned at the early stages of operations.

CHAPTER 3
BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

"Do everything you can to baffle, confuse and mislead the enemy"

British Standing Orders, North Africa 1942.

GENERAL

1. Tactical commanders plan and prepare for upcoming battles and engagements according to the terms of battle set by campaign and major operation plans developed at the operational level. Corps and divisions fight battles. Brigades and smaller units fight engagements. Tactical operations require unity of effort between corps and divisions throughout the depth of operations—rear, close, and deep. The task of tactical commanders is to:

a. coordinate attacks on the enemy in-depth with attacks on his forward units;

b. use indirect approaches and flank positions to achieve tactical surprise;

c. assure the uninterrupted availability of combat support and combat service support;

d. avoid creating lucrative targets;

e. avoid positions that can become isolated as a result of enemy manoeuvre or fires;

f. remain informed in order to execute adjustments to the plan and retain the means to react to opportunities or threats.

2. The tactical commander is the catalyst that executes the means for tactical success—battles and engagements—to satisfy operational ends. The terms of battle set at higher echelons should be exploited tactically to

the maximum extent possible. Successful tactical exploitation of the enemy involves, among other things, using indirect approaches and deception.

TACTICAL DECPTION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

3. The key to successful tactical planning is anticipation of future battle events and being prepared for contingencies. Deception operations are essential in the tactical planning process so that friendly anticipatory processes can be conducted with more certainty and to mask manoeuvre options. In practice, deceptions can play a significant role in:

a. masking the movement of tactical formations;

b. inducing the enemy to miscalculate friendly objectives or areas to be retained;

c. inducing the enemy to miscalculate friendly zones, sectors, and areas of responsibility;

d. creating notional tactical formations and force dispositions; and

e. facilitating the execution of manoeuvre options that may develop during battles and engagements.

4. Tactical commanders exploit operational-level terms of battle by avoiding the enemy's strengths, striking at his weaknesses, and gaining surprise. To gain surprise:

a. feign and demonstrate the use of direct approaches to the objective, while actually using indirect approaches; or vice versa, if the situation so dictates;

b. feign, demonstrate, and display frontal dispositions, while using flank positions to attack command and control as well as logistic facilities;

c. feign, demonstrate, and display notional axes, routes, and battle positions to preserve combat, combat support and

combat service support forces, while simultaneously and harmlessly depleting enemy ground and air attack;

d. feign the air axes of attack using aviation and air assault units; and

e. Demonstrate and display notional units to enhance real-unit survivability.

5. When changes to the tactical plan are required by the military situation, mask those changes with deception operations.

CLOSE OPERATIONS

6. Close operations involve the fight between the committed forces and the readily available tactical reserves of both combatants. Deceptions employed in close operations:

a. can be planned or ad hoc;

b. should centre on facilitating the tactical scheme of manoeuvre and fire support plan;

c. should have localised, immediate effects during battle; and

d. commanders generally weight their main efforts with every available asset.

7. Main efforts are usually complemented with feints, supporting attacks. If the main effort fails or an opportunity is presented during combat to exploit the feint as the main effort, commanders must be able to shift the effort rapidly. Proper positioning of reserves to follow up either the main or supporting effort serves two purposes: to impede enemy assessments of where the main effort will actually occur by evaluating the position of the reserve within the defensive posture, to induce the enemy to position his reserve force at a location from which it can generally respond to both the main and supporting attacks, but cannot decisively influence either.

DEEP OPERATIONS

8. Deep operations are employed to attack those enemy forces that can influence close operations, but are not yet in contact. Successful attack on them:

a. isolates the close battle;

b. alters the tempo of battle; and

c. preserves freedom of action.

9. Deceptions in support of deep operations should either:

d. facilitate exposing enemy rear forces to attack;

e. facilitate their commitment at a time and place that is tactically irrelevant to the close fight; and

f. delay, disrupt, or divert them.

REAR OPERATIONS

10. Rear area operations preserve the commander's freedom of action and assure uninterrupted support to the battle. Rear area units, whose assistance to the main effort is vital, receive the highest priority for protection, thus enhancing survivability.

11. Deception in support of rear operations may show either the build-up of area logistic bases, notional fire and air defence sites, or the increase of survivability of the units. The use of decoys for survivability will not be reported as a deception operation.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL DECPTION PLANS

12. Operational deception plans facilitate the conduct of campaigns and major operations by setting the terms of battle before battles and engagements occur. Tactical deception plans exploit the tactical situation

being immediately confronted by the tactical commander. Although tactical organisations are not precluded from developing tactical-level deceptions independent of the operational context, they will usually be derivative slices of operational deception plans.

13. Tactical deception plans should not be developed in operational plan vacuums for the following reasons:

a. Operational deception plans set the terms of battle in which tactical commanders fight: the size of the enemy force; its composition and dispositions; the enemy and friendly mission; where and when the battle will be fought; and tactical objectives; in other words, the factors of the estimate. These operationally induced factors directly influence the nature of the enemy intelligence collection, decision cycle and troop control procedures, which tactical commanders will be deceptively manipulating in order to favourably influence tactical battle outcomes.

b. Operational deception plans should contain deception event tasking for one or more tactical commands subordinate to the operational commander. Operational deception plans must, therefore, ensure that tactical-level plans are not working at cross-purposes with one another.

c. Operational deception plans might call for one subordinate tactical command to provide support to another subordinate tactical command to satisfy the latter's operational deception-related tasking. Tactical deception plans must, therefore, be coordinated at the operational level to ensure they are not working at cross-purposes with one another. Figure 3-1 depicts the relationship between operational and tactical deception plans.



Figure 3-1: Relationship between operational and tactical deception plans.

CHAPTER 4
DECEPTION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

"Since World War II, stratagem has come to be treated as the modern invention and arcane province of intelligence services. Its original and most effective place is at the central…levels of the military planning process".

Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War.

GENERAL

1. Deceptions are not ends in and of themselves. One does not conduct deceptions merely to deceive. Deception is used to support the operational or tactical mission. The G3 is the primary staff officer responsible for deception planning within the command. This duty falls to him, as the executor for operations, for the following reasons:

a. Deceptions are as much a function of operations as real plans. They are part of the concept of operation chosen to accomplish the mission.

b. Alternative courses of action are developed by him and given to the commander for selection.

c. He drives other staff estimates and annex development processes that result in harmonised plans and coherent operation orders.

d. Fragmentary order (FRAGO) adjustments to plan and orders require similar adjustments to deception plans.

TECHNIQUES

2. Units will use its normal staff organisation and mission planning techniques to plan for and to supervise the execution of deception operations. The battlefield deception elements, which are activated within corps and divisions, are critical in accomplishing the deception mission of the unit. These reinforce the G3 with the necessary expertise to perform the

planning, target selection, and coordination needed for success. The deception elements deploy and operate as integral parts of the G3 staff. However, when security is essential, other organisational techniques may be considered. Three other techniques could be used in conducting deception planning:

a. commander only,

b. close-hold, or

c. ad hoc staff.

3. Planning techniques can be different each time, depending on existing conditions. For example, if the battlefield is fluid and fast moving, the control required would be less than in a stable situation where opponents can continuously observe one another. Time available, location of the unit, security posture, the nature of the true operation, and the action selected as the primary deception vehicle will also affect the selection of the technique. Each organisational technique has different advantages.

4. In the commander only technique, a commander elects to conduct deception, issues direct orders, and keeps all details of the plan for himself. The deception may be his own concept or may be directed by his superior. None of his staff is fully aware of his true intentions. Although the advantage of this technique is a high degree of secrecy, its potential dangers are obvious. In this technique, the commander's deceptive intent is not made known to the staff or subordinate units; and by not employing the expertise of the staff, a serious error might occur that normal staff planning would have identified. In addition, errors could occur by subordinates not knowing the commander's intent.

5. In the close-hold technique, officers from staff sections and units are detached to the operations element to assist in the planning effort. When the plan is completed, it is coordinated with those staff office chiefs and supporting units represented before being approved by the chief of staff or the commander. The advantages of this method are expediency and OPSEC. This technique can be used to maintain secrecy when a unit is in an assembly or marshalling area, since a group of planners can be isolated from their sections or units for several hours to conduct rapid deception planning under secure conditions. The danger is that other staff actions may be neglected.

6. In planning deception for small-scale (brigade and battalion) operations, the organisation usually chosen is the ad hoc staff, and the operations officer exercises staff supervision over the ad hoc staff.

SEQUENCE

7. The sequence of actions in making and executing decisions involves a series of separate actions or steps performed concurrently by the commander and his staff. Knowing this process will help to understand the function of the estimates, their relationship within the decision-making process, and the coordination that occurs between a commander and his staff before a decision is reached.

8. The commander decides how elements of his command will accomplish missions. He issues timely orders to control the operations of his forces. The staff assists the commander in arriving at, and executing decisions. Operational decisions are usually of such fundamental importance that the commander personally influences the preparation of orders and directing their execution.

9. The sequence of actions followed by the commander and his staff upon receipt of a mission describes a logical and systematic process for solving major problems and arriving at properly considered decisions. Keep in mind, however, that this sequence is flexible and that the actions of individual staff members will overlap, be accomplished concurrently, or even omitted. The important point to remember is that the actions within the process will produce the best results when followed logically and sequentially whenever faced with a mission-oriented decision.

PROCESS

10. Figure 4-1 outlines the tactical deception planning process. Figure 4-2 shows how this process fits into the decision-making process. (See Annex B for a deception planning worksheet) A discussion of the inter-relationship between the two processes follows.

STEP 1- SITUATION ANLYSIS

Current and projected friendly situation
Current and projected enemy situation
Target analysis
Analysis of the friendly and enemy projected situation
Stated desired situation

STEP 2 – DECEPTION OBJECTIVE FORMULATION

Deception objective: enemy action or non-action which causes the desired situation
Mission objective: what the friendly forces must accomplish

STEP 3 – DESIRED PERCEPTION

What must the enemy think, to make him act
Deriving suitable perception:
Estimate enemy's current perception
Determine what the enemy should perceive

STEP 4 – DECEPTION STORY

Information conveyed to the target which will cause him to form a desired perception
Develop options
Analyze options

STEP 5 – DECEPTION PLAN

How do we plan to convey the story

Figure 4-1: Deception planning process

11. Based on knowledge of the latest facts and current situation the commander completes his mission analysis, restates the mission, and issues his planning guidance. This provides the necessary staff direction for concurrent planning by providing a framework for making studies and estimates. The amount of planning guidance given varies with each mission, the volume and validity of information available, the situation, and the experience of the commander and staff. Planning guidance does not occur at one specific time in the planning process. However, initial guidance should precede the preparation of the staff estimates. In order for the staff to properly include deception planning in their staff estimates, the

commander needs to consider the following when developing his initial guidance:

a. Should deception be considered in support of the main objective? Is the enemy susceptible to deception?

b. What percentage of friendly forces can be used to support deception?

c. Should deception be used in support of supplementary missions?

d. Are units used to support the deception effort needed for the success of the main objective?

e. If yes to above, what is the maximum time allowed for the units to stop their deception efforts and redeploy to the main objective area?

f. Does the success of the operation depend on the success of the deception?

12. Having received the commander's planning guidance, staff members are prepared to focus their individual efforts on the problem to be solved. The G3 is responsible for the preparation of the deception estimate.

13. The following is a sample of a commander's planning guidance for deception: "I want the staff to consider the use of deception to support our mission. I want at least one deception course of action for each actual course of action. For planning purposes, we can commit one armour task force to support deception, with the normal artillery and logistic support slice. I want them to be able to stop deception operations and support the main attack within four hours of the order to do so."

14. Deception should be considered in each course of action. Deception estimates need to be integrated into each course of action. For each course of action, a separate deception staff estimate needs to be prepared. In analysing the courses of action for presentation to the commander, the course of action that presents the greatest opportunity for success will be chosen.

15. Deception operations have a greater potential for success if they are planned in depth as an integral part of the decision-making process. By understanding the potential of deception and the costs involved right from the start, the deception mission has a greater possibility of successfully supporting the actual mission.



Figure 4-2: Deception planning relationship.

STEP 1¾ SITUATION ANALYSIS

16. Using the deception process, the planner needs to do a situation analysis and tentative deception objective formulation at this time. It is important to remember that this process is in support of an actual course of action. Following is a discussion of the five steps in the deception planning process.

17. Current and Projected Friendly Situation. Write down the military objective that the deception plan is intended to support. Look at available forces and operational plans of the basic plan. List friendly assumptions. To facilitate data gathering, the deception planner should be an integrated element of the planning staff.

18. Current and Projected Enemy Situation. The following intelligence data must be gathered and provided by the intelligence officer:

a. Objective data:

(1) how forces are deployed;

(2) command and control procedures;

(3) intelligence processing times; and

(4) order of battle.

b. Subjective data:

(1) doctrine,

(2) historical precedents, and

(3) basic beliefs.

c. Assumptions about the enemy:

(1) who the target is (decision-maker);

(2) what the target expects us to do;

(3) the target's current perceptions based on what the target knows: open source information, compromised material, existing political and military environment, and basic beliefs and values; and

(4) the target's current perception, based on what the target does not know: uncompromised classified information, what your exact plans are, and third party reaction to situation.

d. Based on the target's perceptions, a prediction of future enemy actions.

e. A comparison of future friendly and enemy courses of action.

f. A statement of the desired situation.

19. A typical example of a desired situation statement is: "To have out-numbered friendly forces cross one of two red controlled bridges while encountering minimal enemy defences."

20. In formulating the deception objective, it is critical to know the time involved in running a deception operation. Figure 4-3 illustrates the deception time cycle. If after using this objective formulation checklist you determine that you don't have enough time, planning of this deception concept must stop. You must begin formulating an alternate deception objective.

STEP 2¾ DECEPTIVE OBJECTIVE FORMULATION

21. This is the most important element of the deception planning process. In developing the deception objective statement, it is important to understand the fundamental difference between it and a mission statement. A mission statement states what friendly forces are tasked to accomplish. A deception statement states the action or non-action that the target must take to bring about the desired situation, (not friendly forces)?

TIME OF MAXIMUM DISADVANTAGE

When should this occur: tomorrow, next week or next month? Obviously the amount of time for the planning and execution will limit the scope of the deception operation..

ENEMY FORCE EXECUTION

How long will the enemy tactical forces need to perform the desired action? For example, if the deception objective is movement of an enemy squadron to some distant point, time must be allowed for the appropriate enemy commander to issue orders and for the enemy forces to execute them.

ENEMY COMMANDER'S DECISION

Is the enemy commander cautious or bold? Will he react to initial indicators, or will he demand extensive confirmation through other intelligence sources before reaching a decision? Once a decision is made, how long will he need to formulate and issue orders? Be sure to include an estimate of the time required by the enemy communication system to move the order to subordinate commanders.

THE ENEMY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

How much time should be allowed for the enemy to produce intelligence as a result of the deception efforts? How long will it take to convey this intelligence to the enemy commander? The key is the level at which the decision will be made. Certain types of information (such as photographic intelligence) is frequently more readily available to senior headquarters. We must estimate the time required to move the information we are presenting to that particular enemy level we want to affect.

EXECUTION OF THE DECEPTION TASKS

When should displays, demonstrations or feints begin to be observed by the enemy intelligence system? How long should each last? Which unit or units will do what? Where will it be done? When and possibly how will it be done? Since you have not yet planned all your tasks (story and plan) at this point, you may have to estimate this now and adjust it later when those details are firm.

DISSEMINATION OF THE DECEPTION PLAN

How long will it take to publish the deception plan? Usually of necessity, the details of the deception plan are close-hold, and therefore, distributed to a limited number of people. This might imply the use of couriers instead of electrical means to disseminate the plan. Consequently, the planner should expect dissemination of the deception plan to be more time consuming than the dissemination of a standard operations order and must allocate time accordingly.

PLANNING

Having worked backwards to this point, any time left between the time at which the plan must be disseminated and the present is available for planning. Prior deception training and contingency planning allow a unit to use this time for preparation of the deception plan.

Figure 4-3: Deception time cycle.

22. Elements. The following are elements of a deception statement:

a. Who will perform the act (a threat commander with the power to bring about our desired situation)?

b. What act is to be performed?

c. When will it be performed (when is the target to act or not-act? How long does this need to be maintained)?

d. Where will it be performed (the geography of the deception)?

23. Who is the target to affect (Qualities. The following are qualities of a deception objective statement:

a. simple and concise;

b. requires considerable thought and effort to develop; and

c. **Critical**. If incorrectly identified, desired situation may not be attained.

24. Example A typical example of a deception objective statement is: "I want the enemy regimental commander to move his reserve forces from Hill 456 to Hill 123 NLT H-2."

25. Evaluation Criteria. The following are the evaluation criteria of a deception objective:

a. Does the target action stated in the deception objective compare favourably to past target actions in similar circumstances?

b. Does the stated target action correlate with the target's doctrine, tactics, and military goals?

c. Does the target know enough, have enough time, and have the authority to take the action required in the objective?

d. How closely does the stated target action match his prioritised goals? Again, the intelligence officer will have to help provide this assessment. Consider cost benefit to target in terms of his assets versus the military risk.

e. Subjective judgement as to how closely the stated objective action correlates to real actions the target is likely to take based on the actual situation.

f. Singleness of purpose: any action taken by the target will have more than one consequence for the deceiver. The more the consequences conform to the desired situation, the better the objective.

26. As the operations officer determines the possible courses of action, he passes them to the other staff officers. The intelligence officer refines the intelligence estimate in light of the courses of action and plans for support of deception operations.

27. Using information received from other staff members, personnel and logistic officers complete their estimates. They determine what major problems exist in providing the required support. They decide which of the proposed courses of action can be supported from a personnel and logistic viewpoint. The conduct of deception activities by logistic units can greatly increase the burden placed on CSS assets and personnel. Those planning the deceptions must know the limits of the CSS assets available, as well as the personnel and maintenance factors that might affect participation in the deception.

28. Meanwhile, the operations officer completes his operations estimate. The result will determine that course of action that offers the greatest probability of success. The operations officer coordinates with other staff members and considers any advantages or limitations developed as a result of their estimates. Then the recommendation developed in the operation estimate becomes the coordinated staff recommendation.

29. The operations officer normally presents the coordinated staff recommendation to the commander as a statement of the general scheme of manoeuvre to be adopted. The operations officer should comment on any significant problems and elaborate on the recommendation to ensure that the commander is fully informed.

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE

30. While staff members are completing their estimates, the commander is concurrently making his own. His estimate prepares him to receive and evaluate the staff recommendation and to make a decision.

31. When he receives the staff recommendation, the commander completes his estimate and states his decision. Even if the effectiveness of deception is beyond question, the cost of applying it should not be underestimated. Every attempt at deception costs in terms of manpower, time, equipment, and training for specific skills required, and the logistic effort needed to support it. As the commander comes to a decision, he must realise the support required for the success of the deception effort, as well as the potential payoff.

PREPARATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS

32. With the commander's decision for employment of the unit, the staff plans can be finalised. The staff must finalise all of the operational details by continuing to plan and prepare the orders necessary to implement the commander's decision.

33. At this point in the deception planning process, the deception objective can be finalised. Using the situation analysis for the particular course of action chosen, the desired deception perception can be completed. In conjunction with the mission order, the deception story and the deception plan can be completed.

STEP 3¾ DESIRED PERCEPTION

34. In general, perceptions are based on an individual view of reality and the current situation, as well as a lifetime of experiences. One's perceptions of the world drive one's actions. However, truths consistent with one theory may also be consistent with other theories.

35. Desired perceptions are the view the target must hold to execute the action stated in the deception objective. A desired perception should present a threat or opportunity to the target. Desired perception statements have three elements:

a. Who must hold the perception (usually the target)? In this regard, the target's view of reality or his perception is influenced by multiple sources of information.

b. What is the perception about (normally a threat or an opportunity)?

c. When must the deception be held, and for how long (normally driven by the deception objective)?

36. The following methods are used to generate desired perceptions:

a. historical precedents, past enemy actions;

b. intelligence formal and informal studies of the target; and

c. brainstorming the “know your enemy” approach.

37. The following questions must be considered when evaluating desired perception choices:

a. Is it believable to the target?

(1) Is it consistent with his military experience about the deceiver? Would our unit really do what the story portrays?

(2) Is it consistent with his political ideology? Are we forcing him to act contrary to his political training?

(3) Is it consistent with his cultural values? Are we leading him to an action that his basic culture will not allow?

b. Does it present an opportunity for the target?

c. Does it reduce or increase the threat to the enemy (perception)?

d. Can we maintain the perception for the required amount of time?

e. Will other operations compromise the deception, or support it?

38. A typical example of a deception perception is: “The enemy regimental commander must believe that when blue forces attack, they will mass and use bridge A to secure their primary objective--hill 123. He must believe this not later than 72 hours prior to commencement of blue offensive and must retain this belief until commencement of blue offensive.”

STEP 4¾ THE DECEPTION STORY

39. The deception story is that information conveyed to the target that will cause him to form a desired perception. It is coordinated between the operations officer and the intelligence officer. Points of coordination include:

a. current blue force profile;

b. enemy's current perception of our true operation;

c. enemy level of command which will take action on deception operations;

d. personalities of enemy commanders and intelligence officers; and

e. determination of the deception story for both feasibility and believability.

40. Operations officer plans the deception tasks. With assistance from the OPSEC staff element, he must:

a. maintain and update friendly force profiles;

b. identify friendly indicators that should be considered in deception planning;

c. recommend essential elements of friendly information (EEFI); and

d. recommend the deception story.

41. The intelligence officer:

a. identifies enemy peculiarities or weaknesses that might make him susceptible to a deception operation;

b. identifies the enemy's likely reaction to the deception operation;

c. recommends to the operations officer which information needs to be fed to the enemy to make him believe the deception story; and

d. recommends information requirements (IR) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to verify whether the deception plan is working.

STEP 5¾ THE DECEPTION PLAN

42. The deception plan will:

a. outline the methods selected for conveying the deception story to the enemy;

b. ensure all means are considered; and

c. conform to normal SOPs.

43. The Operations officer:

a. decides and tasks those units which will accomplish the deception tasks;

b. develops an implementation plan to sequence the tasks (see a sample deception implementation schedule at Annex C);

c. with assistance from the EW officer, develops electronic deception measures for the deception operation;

d. coordinates electronic deception measures with the signal officer;

e. prepares the deception annex to plans and orders;

f. monitors and ensures execution of the deception plan; and

g. with assistance from the OPSEC staff element, develops OPSEC measures for the deception plan and the real plan.

44. The intelligence officer:

a. recommends the means to project the story;

b. in coordination with the Counter Intelligence (CI) analysis section and the Intelligence Collection and Analysis Center (ICAC), develops and maintains an enemy collection database. The database can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses in the enemy's collection capabilities. It can also be used to determine which means should be used; and

c. recommends IR and PIR to check on and verify whether or not the deception story is working.

45. The Service Support officer:

a. prepares a logistic estimate for the commander, analysing logistic factors affecting the accomplishment of the overall operation and the deception operations; and

b. provides the operations officer with advice concerning the feasibility of various friendly courses of action dealing with deception operations, as well as the burden that will be placed on logistic personnel and equipment.

46. The Personnel officer:

a. advises the operations officer on the availability of personnel resources to augment a chosen deception operation; and

b. provides a personnel estimate with conclusions and recommendations based on mission tasking within the force.

47. After the plan or operation order is prepared in final form, it is presented to the commander for approval. This is omitted if the urgency of the situation so warrants, and if the commander has previously delegated the authority to have it prepared and issued without his personal approval.

SUPERVISION

48. It is important for the operations officer to supervise and look for flaws in the deception. Remembering that the desired result is for the enemy to see the deception and take action, he must ensure that the deception operation is implemented on schedule. He must make adjustments or changes as needed during the operation.

49. The intelligence officer monitors the execution of the deception plan. He ensures that the deception plan is working and that the enemy is not conducting a counter-deception operation. He must determine which enemy collection assets can or cannot collect the deception story. He recommends whether or not the deception operation should be continued, modified, or terminated.

50. Once a deception operation has been terminated, the results must be evaluated (see Annex D for an evaluation checklist). Analysing the success or failure of a deception operation will assist in the planning and execution of future operations. This also provides a further analysis of the friendly OPSEC posture.

51. In terminating a deception operation, care must be taken not to end it too soon, or unrealistically. Just as care and timing went into the build-up of the deception plan, all deception operations must have a plausible ending. They must terminate in a manner similar to the way it would in an actual operation.

CHAPTER 5
DECEPTION MEANS

"To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds."

Mao Tse-Tung, 1893-1976, on Distracted War.

GENERAL

1. Deception means are the methods, resources, and techniques used to convey or deny information to the enemy. Deception requires providing false indicators to the enemy. If the supporting attack is to be portrayed as a main attack (a feint), the unit conducting the feint must give the enemy evidence that it is the main attack. The enemy collects his battlefield information through visual, olfactory, sonic, and electronic methods.

VISUAL

2. Much of the enemy's intelligence is based on what is observed on the ground or seen in aerial photographs. Hence, effective visual deception is critical to the projection of the deception story. Visual evidence alone, however, will not deceive the enemy. It must be integrated with the projection of olfactory, sonic, and electronic deception, including the movement of units. The enemy's collection capability determines the necessary combination. Since the enemy cannot see the entire battlefield continuously, visual deception efforts must be targeted for specific collector's known to be used in that particular area. The enemy's collection activities should lead him to accept the deception action as our true intention.

DUMMIES AND DECOYS

3. Two items commonly used in visual deception are dummies and decoys. A dummy is an imitation of something on the battlefield. A decoy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from a more important area. When a dummy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from some

other area, it is also termed a decoy. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment for use as dummies. If not extensively damaged, unserviceable or combat-loss items can be used. Dummies may also be available from supply stocks, or they may be constructed locally using salvage. The distance from which the enemy observes friendly items or actions dictates what degree of realism is required.

4. Visual deception activity must present a realistic and complete picture. If you are simulating a fortification, an installation, or another activity, you must show significant items the enemy expects to see. For example, the deception activity must present personnel and vehicular movement. The enemy will expect to see tanks with gun tubes, certain types of silhouettes, and tracks on the ground. If dummy vehicles and equipment are used, then the type and number of tracks for the size unit we want to portray are necessary. It is best to make them with real equipment. Evidence of troop occupancy must also be present. Trash and other debris should be scattered in the area if it is, in fact, characteristic of the unit portrayed. By comparing photographs taken at different times, the enemy can readily detect a lack of movement. Logical activity should be accomplished by movement of dummies or decoys, by operation of equipment, and if possible, by activity of some real troops to show evidence of occupancy. These activities must continue during both darkness and inclement weather.

CAMOUFLAGE

5. Camouflage is an important element in deception operations. If we are going to project visual evidence of a deception story, the enemy must not observe evidence of our true operation. We hide, blend, or disguise to prevent the enemy from observing our real activities. However, when employing visual deception, we may camouflage all or part of a real or false military object to project the desired effect. We may intentionally camouflage something poorly so that he will observe what we want him to observe, or we may completely conceal a unit we do not want observed. In any type or size of deception, it is important that projection of visual evidence be consistent. When portraying a particular unit, the use of camouflage must be consistent with that unit's prior camouflage signature (see the Countersurveillance Manual B-GL-319-004-/FP-001).

SMOKE

6. Smoke always attracts attention, so the enemy will probably be watching when it is deployed. Smoke helps confuse the enemy, creating an element of surprise that the friendly commander can use to his advantage (Figure 5-1 illustrates smoke deception). Smoke supports deception operations in the following ways:

a. Screening the site of an activity. When attacking, smoke could be used to conceal friendly units and individual weapon systems. This enables the commander to manoeuvre behind a screen and deceive the enemy about his strength and position.

b. Using smoke with decoys to simulate installations or situations and units or activities that normally employ military smoke. Using smoke, decoys can be moved with fewer hazards to troops and less likelihood of the enemy identifying them. For example, factories and power plants normally produce smoke. Therefore, smoke must be used with decoy factories and power plants to add realism.

c. Blinding enemy observers and reducing the effectiveness of enemy target acquisition means.

d. Simulating damage. Bomb and fire damages are the types usually simulated. Simulated damage may cause the enemy to stop or lessen the number and force of his attacks on what he believes is a crippled installation. Smoke used in simulated damage may be effective on oil refineries, power plants, bridges, railroads, warehouses, and other large installations. Simulating activity by screening a site where there is no actual activity.

e. Simulating ground haze to make a small unit appear to be much larger, or simulating mist when visibility and the battlefield situation could unmask decoys.



Figure 5-1: Smoke Deception

PEOPLE AND OBJECTS

7. Using previously prepared positions increases the realism of visual deception. Switching dummy and real items in and out of these positions may calm suspicion that the activity portrayed is a deception. It is especially important to switch real and false items if the deception must be projected for long periods of time.

FALSE VERSUS REAL

8. If the enemy is to believe a deception activity is real, he must be able to see it. However, care must be taken to make sure that visibility of the deception activity is not too obvious, otherwise the enemy will not accept the projected deception as a real activity. While a deception activity is being projected, it is critical that real activities be concealed from the enemy's view.

OLFACTORY

9. Olfactory deception is the projection of odour. The smells projected during a deception must be consistent with the visual, sonic, and electronic methods used. One factor affecting the use of olfactory measures is proximity to the enemy. The enemy must be close enough to friendly units to smell our simulated battlefield odours if the olfactory measure is to be useful. Planners must calculate how the weather will influence the effectiveness of methods. The olfactory methods used must complement the deception story.

10. Some smells common to every military force are food, explosives, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL). An individual, a small patrol, or a larger unit to assist in adding credence to deception can use cooking smells. Certain smells might suggest the size of a unit by indicating whether or not a dining facility is in operation. Smells can also assist in simulating small arms and artillery fire. Smells associated with vehicles such as diesel, gasoline, and oil may also be used to enhance the deception story.

SONIC

11. Sonic deception is the projection of sounds to produce battlefield noises. It is directed against the enemy's sound-ranging gear and the human ear. What the enemy sees must be reinforced by what he hears. If a unit is being displayed to enemy surveillance, vehicle sounds and equipment noises should match the sounds the enemy knows are used by the unit being projected. Devices used to portray the sonic picture may be real items or simulators. Real sounds should be blended with those reproduced artificially since a false sound by itself will seldom be successful on the battlefield. Additionally, sounds used should originate from logical places the enemy will accept as occupied by the unit. Sounds must be compatible

with their purported origins. For example, the enemy will doubt the sound of tanks in a dense swamp. Sonic methods must also coincide with visual measures being presented. In projecting the sound of a vehicle convoy, the sound must seem to come from the convoy depicted through visual methods. Obviously, the less effective the enemy's visual observation, the more effective the projection of sonic methods. The effectiveness of sonic methods is increased at night or when the point of origin is obscured by artificial means such as smoke. The range of sound signals depends on climatic conditions, vegetation, topography, temperature, and humidity. Although distances cannot be predicted; cool, humid, still atmosphere, and water surfaces carry sound best.

12. Sonic methods are also used to confuse and mislead the enemy. An individual with normal hearing can recognise several separate sounds that arrive simultaneously. However, an estimate of the distance from the source is usually unreliable. It is usually perceived that a sound rising in frequency is coming towards one and a sound lowering in frequency is moving away. Prepared recordings that manipulate frequency can mislead or confuse an enemy listening from a fixed location. In any case, sonic methods to be employed should be tested in surroundings similar to the deception area whenever possible. Deception must also attempt to prevent sounds that will give away the true operation. At night, strict enforcement of basic light and noise discipline is necessary. Padding may be used when the primary interest is concealment. The operations area may also be saturated with indicators. These can obscure the sounds of preparation of movement associated with the true operational intent.

ELECTRONIC

13. Electronic deception materials and equipment are used to manipulate, falsify, and distort enemy sensors. Several highly useful techniques can help the tactical commander portray the false. These include:

a. manipulative electronic deception (MED),

b. simulative electronic deception (SED), and

c. imitative electronic deception (IED).

14. Electronic deception operations must be conducted in such a manner that realistic signatures are replicated. Electronic deception operations are often conducted as part of a larger operation. Personnel conducting electronic deception should be specially trained and skilled to ensure that all electronic signatures are orchestrated with other deception events to provide overall fidelity (see Figure 5-2). Deception planners must remember that what the enemy collects electronically must agree with what he has seen, heard, and smelled.



Figure 5-2: Electronic deception scenario.

15. When electronic deception is employed, it is crucial that these deception efforts are specifically targeted to the threat. This ensures that what is being portrayed by specific electronic means can be gathered by enemy collection efforts. For example, all electronic deception should be targeted against the known capabilities of the enemy collection threat.

MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

16. MED involves changing the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. It can:

a. combat enemy EW and signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities;

b. manipulate friendly forces electromagnetic emissions by modifying technical characteristics and profiles; and

c. deny or deceive the enemy as to friendly intentions.

17. MED is performed in two basic forms: Manipulative communications deception (MCD) and manipulative non-communications deception (MNCD).

18. Manipulative Communications Deception. MCD requires a thorough knowledge of the friendly forces' communications signature over extended time and in various combat operations and conditions. MCD techniques include:

a. false traffic levels,

b. false peaks in communications,

c. traffic padding,

d. routing,

e. electronic cover, and

f. controlled breaches of security.

19. Manipulative Non-communications Deception. MNCD is applied by using the same principles as MCD, but differs from MCD by the equipment used. Non-communications emitters, versus communications emitters, are used. Activity of the non-communications emitter is increased or decreased to indicate a difference in the activity of a unit.

SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

20. SED is used to mislead the enemy as to actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of friendly forces. It can:

a. simulate non-existing units or capabilities at false locations;

b. simulate communications and non-communications emitters; and

c. be used for unit, new or different equipment, and false location simulation.

IMITATIVE ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

21. IED is conducted against both communications and non-communications collection efforts. This is accomplished through imitative communications deception (ICD) and imitative non-communications deception (INCD).

22. Imitative Communications Deception. ICD injects false and misleading information directly into enemy communications networks by gaining admission as an enemy communications system. ICD:

a. must not create its own unique signature; and

b. is based on the sensitivity of intelligence techniques and equipment used. It includes bonafide station within the net and the sophistication of nuisance, planned message and cryptographic intrusion, and deception jamming.

23. Imitative Non-communications Deception. INCD is conducted for the same purpose as ICD but involves the introduction of radiation into the

enemy's electronic non-communications systems to imitate their emissions and to confuse and deceive. It is primarily directed toward target acquisition, surveillance, and electronic reconnaissance systems. INCD:

a. produces specific signatures for each class of system;

b. requires knowledge of enemy non-communications systems characteristics; and

c. can provide false target generation or spoofing.

24. The following must be considered during the planning phase of electronic deception: personnel trained for various types of electronic deception must be identified and available; and enemy vulnerability to electronic deception and electronic signature portrayal must be realistic. This must include:

a. proper output per type of equipment portrayal;

b. realistic net structure portrayal;

c. traffic volumes that match norms for the type of operation being portrayed;

d. unique characteristics of unit;

e. portrayal of secure and unsecured communications; and

f. representations of proper echelons of command and control.

RESOURCES

25. Only operational need and the imagination of the deception planner limit the resources available for deception operations. Actual equipment and units, field expedient use of raw materials, salvaged or unserviceable equipment, and specialised deception devices can and should all be used by deception planners to achieve an effective product.

26. Corps has battlefield deception elements operating under the staff supervision of the G3. The elements are comprised of trained battlefield deception specialists in the areas of plans and operations, communications signature, physical signature, and electronic signature sections or teams. These sections or teams are responsible for the planning and execution of deception tasks and events in support of the commander's deception objective. Although similar resources are available at division and brigade-group levels, there is no dedicated team. These are assembled from existing resources as required.

TIME

27. The required duration of deception efforts is an important planning consideration. Sufficient time must be available for the enemy to act or react in a desired manner to the deception story. It is undesirable to devise an elaborate deception plan if the enemy does not have sufficient time to read it and take actions that complement friendly intentions. If the period during which the deception must be maintained is shorter than the period of sensor reaction--that is, the time required for the sensor to provide data to the enemy tactical decision maker--then that specific sensor or channel of information need not be deceived. In addition, certain threat systems can only be deceived for short duration. However, the longer the required deception effort, the greater the chances of exposure. The timing of your plan should prevent the enemy from effectively shifting his centre of gravity to counter your main effort once your deception is finally uncovered.

DEVICES

28. Specialised deception devices include:

a. SED devices which are used to electronically simulate radio frequency (RF) output or net configuration of a simulated unit.

b. Multi-spectral decoys are devices that simulate both physical and infrared signatures of selected equipment or vehicles. They can be fabricated either with improvised material or use stand decoys from industry.

c. Fixed target indicators and moving target indicators that provide the radar signature of a stationary or moving vehicle based on corner reflector techniques.

29. These devices will significantly enhance the believability of deception operations. They can provide deceptive signatures without sacrificing the equipment necessary to conduct support operations.

PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

30. The degree of success achieved by a decoy unit or facility depends on small, seemingly unimportant details typically associated with the portrayed unit or activity. These are difficult, or even impossible, to duplicate by deception personnel and devices alone. In order for the majority of deception operations to succeed, augmentation of equipment and personnel will be required to:

a. provide a complete signature (that is, physical activity and movement around the deception activity);

b. assist in erecting display equipment;

c. provide indications of normal support activities that would be associated with the deception activity (such as ration runs, vehicular movement or ground activity).

31. While equipment decoys are realistic from certain distances and angles, their quality can never completely substitute for signatures produced by the real thing. Additionally, the quantity of deception equipment may not be sufficient to provide a realistic display. The use of real equipment, even if it is not operational, should be considered for use in support of every deception operation.

MATERIEL

32. Materiel assets for the deception operation may be divided into two parts: those that help us hide the real, and those that help us portray the false.

HIDING THE REAL

33. At the core of any successful deception is OPSEC—hiding the real situation from enemy sensors. These sensors range from a reconnaissance patrol leader with binoculars to space platforms. The most commonly used techniques and materials to prevent threat detection are:

a. camouflage,

b. suppressive and absorptive screens,

c. smoke,

d. shielding and/or masking various types of emitters,

e. using terrain to mask units and movements,

f. signal security (SIGSEC) procedures, and

g. electronic warfare.

34. The enemy's sensor capabilities and our exposure time determine the level of OPSEC necessary to successfully hide our real situation and portray the false with deception. For example, tactical deception against an enemy capable of limited intelligence collection through a limited sensor array would have to use far simpler techniques to be seen and effective than against another industrialised nation that is capable of fielding a significant array of sensors. Today's tactical deception must be capable of fooling low technology sensors like cameras and binoculars, radio scanners and high-tech intelligence like:

a. high resolution photo satellites,

b. unmanned air vehicles (UAV),

c. moving target indicator and imaging stand-off radar,

d. tactical air reconnaissance,

e. radar and radio locators,

f. magnetic, sonic, and heat sensors,

g. imaging radar, and

h. infrared.

PORTRAYING THE FALSE

35. The most common methods of portraying the false for tactical units may be divided into two categories: visual and electronic. Time of exposure will have a great effect on how we plan visual deception. A low level air attack has little time to determine if a tank decoy is real or false. That tank decoy would however not likely fool infrared photo interpreters, unless it contained an infrared generator to fool that sensor system. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Israelis found that simple visual decoys were sufficient to draw the fire of attacking enemy fighter aircraft. Headquarters, air defence, radar, and artillery assets are priority enemy targets and are vulnerable to air attack. For these reasons, these systems represent an excellent use of decoys. Decoys of various vehicles and equipment have been designed and used in the past. Designs have ranged from fold-ups, inflatable, and bolt on; materials have included plastic, Styrofoam, and fibreglass. It should be apparent that the level of sophistication of deception equipment and techniques must progress from the visual only canvas and baling wire approach of decoys and dummies that were used in World War II. A multi-spectral approach must be taken when procuring or fabricating decoys. Improvised decoys should as a minimum consider the visual, near IR and thermal aspect of static tactical decoys; and the visual, near IR, thermal and RADAR aspects for installations and mobile decoys. Our deception devices and techniques must be able to fool the epected array of enemy sensor technology. Our deception efforts must be believable. They must be afforded the same secrecy and security as real items. After World War II, Allied pilots enjoyed telling the story of a decoy airstrip that the Germans were painstakingly constructing entirely of wood. They made wooden aircraft, hangers, fuel points, and gun emplacements. The Germans, however, were lax in their security and camouflage during construction and allied photo experts were able to identify the ruse. On the day after the construction was finally completed, a lone RAF bomber swung in low, circled the airfield once, and dropped one large wooden bomb.

TECHNIQUES

36. Four types of deception techniques are used to present the deception story: feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays.

FEINTS

37. The most familiar deception ploy is the feint. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order to give the appearance of a realistic main attack (see Figure 5-3). The feint is a limited-objective attack, varying in size from a raid to a supporting attack. It should contribute to the overall accomplishment of the mission and mislead the enemy. A supporting attack is a feint when it is presented to the enemy as a main effort. A supporting attack is usually conducted during an offensive operation. When a supported attack is projected to the enemy as part of a deception story, it is also a feint. Feints have been used successfully for several purposes, including causing the enemy decision-maker to:

a. Employ his echelon forces improperly. A feint may cause these forces to move away from the main attack toward the feint, or a feint may be used to hold the enemy's second echelon force where it is.

b. Shift his supporting fires from the main attack. A feint conducted within range of the enemy weapons supporting the defensive position where a friendly main attack will be directed, may cause dilution of fire support.

c. Reveal his defensive fires. A feint may cause premature firing, revealing enemy defensive weapons. The enemy may be forced into defending against aggressive action taken by forces conducting the feint. The attacker may cause enemy weapons to fire by making a feint before and during a main attack and within range of the enemy's weapons.

38. A feint might not always be the principal deception. A series of recurring feints, rather than a single event, might be used. For example, frequent raids may harass the enemy to the extent that he becomes confused and, to some degree, careless. He may become so accustomed to a certain

pattern of activity that he will take little or no action when the friendly main attack actually occurs. He may consider it merely another harassing action.

39. Where does a feint take place? Obviously, the feint must fit the deception story. Looking at the terrain and battlefield dispositions, the commander or staff planner considers:

a. that the area of-interest to the enemy, since he may not react as desired to the threat, is of little value to him;

b. that the enemy may displace his force if the threatened area is beyond the range of his currently employed weapons;

c. that the area of the feint should be at sufficient distance to preclude interference with the true operation; and

d. areas proposed during the initial analysis for a main attack, but later rejected, are often suitable for a feint.



Figure 5-3: A Feint

40. When does a feint take place? Feints may be conducted before or during the true operation. Therefore, the true operation must be considered in determining the time for the feint. Of course, timing is also influenced by the estimated time necessary for the enemy commander to react in the

desired manner. A feint before a main attack usually requires carefully determined lead-time. The feint may be intended to:

a. induce the enemy to move his second-echelon forces from the area of the main attack;

b. maintain his current troop posture;

c. attack his supporting fires so that supporting weapons may be located; or

d. confuse him by frequent harassment.

41. The precise time a feint takes place will vary depending on the commander's intent. For example, moving additional forces will require more time than shifting fires. Therefore, when the intent is to move the second echelon forces, the feint has to be initiated well ahead of the main effort.

42. A feint conducted simultaneously with the main attack may cause the enemy to divert his attention and possibly a portion of his forces and supporting fires.

43. A feint conducted after the main attack is launched can hold the enemy's uncommitted forces in its present location. Faced with a new threat, the enemy becomes uncertain about the location of the main effort.

44. The commander or staff planner also considers the pattern of previous operations. If, for example, friendly forces have been in the habit of making attacks 2 hours before daylight, it may be desirable to conduct a feint at this time.

45. Although the timing of a feint is influenced by these factors, the time a true operation would most likely succeed is the main consideration.

46. Historical Example. A feint before the main attack took place in the first of two major battles that stopped Rommel's Afrika Korps in the fall of 1942. During the battle of Alam Halfa, General Montgomery ordered XIII Corps to attack to close the gaps through which the Germans entered the British positions in the southern portion of the battle area. The tactical purpose of XIII Corps' feint was to cause the enemy forces, especially the German 21st Panzer Division and the Italian Ariette Division, to remain in

the south since Montgomery's master plan for El Alamein directed that the British main attack be made in the north.

DEMONSTRATIONS

47. Another deception task is the demonstration. This is a show of force on the battlefield where a decision is not sought. It is similar to a feint with the exception that no contact with the enemy is intended. A demonstration may be conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy by a show of force with the intent to delude him into an unfavourable course of action.

48. While the demonstration has certain advantages over the feint, it lacks the realism of the feint attack. The advantages of a demonstration are:

a. absence of physical contact with the enemy facilitates subsequent employment of the demonstration force elsewhere;

b. a full force is not always necessary because no contact is made with the enemy, and

c. it permits the use of simulation devices, when available, in place of real items to deceive the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities.

49. The disadvantages of a demonstration are:

a. it is more difficult to portray the deception story convincingly without contact with the enemy; and

b. it is more likely that a demonstration will be identified as a deception earlier in the operation than a feint would be.

50. A demonstration can be used successfully when, during the projection of the deception story, time and distance to the terrain make the lack of contact realistic. In essence, a demonstration attempts to gain enemy response in an area where a friendly force is exhibited; but as the enemy reacts, the friendly force withdraws without engagement.

51. Historical Example. A demonstration is illustrated by the amphibious attack on Okinawa in April 1945 (see Figure 5-4). The operation plan called for 10th Army to make a two-corps attack on the West Side of the island with the III Marine Amphibious Corps (two divisions) and the XXIV Army Corps (two divisions). To cause the Japanese commander to withdraw some of his forces from the area of the real attack, a demonstration was staged on the Southeast coast of the island. The 2d Marine Division embarked on ships and loaded into landing craft offshore from the town of Minetoga, as if preparing to land. The demonstration was repeated the following day. Upon completion of the demonstration, the division embarked and returned to the area of the landing beaches where they reverted to Army reserve. Eventually, the division was landed in the area of fighting. The Japanese commander's estimate is not known; however, the true operation reached initial objectives eight to 10 days earlier than expected. A very similar technique was used in the Gulf War when the US Marines demonstrated an intent to land along the Kuwaiti coast in order to reinforce the belief that the main effort would be in Kuwait and not in Iraq.



Figure 5-4: Demonstration

RUSES

52. Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy in order to obtain an advantage. They are characterised by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection means. Ruses range from simple tactical

tricks employed by individual soldiers to strategic actions employed by nations. The following examples may evoke new methods of employing old tricks:

a. A ruse practised by the Soviets in World War II was to travel parallel to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) when moving into the attack. During this movement, if they were observed, they would reverse their direction. This made it difficult for the defender to determine where the attack was to come or where the actual concentration of forces was taking place.

b. To distort the enemy's estimate of our capabilities, we can look to Rommel for devising a successful ruse. He disguised Volkswagens to look like tanks and intermixed them with real armoured units. This led the British to think he was stronger in tanks than he actually was.

c. A simple but sometimes effective ruse used by the Japanese during World War II was to learn the names of US platoon leaders. Then, when attacking US positions they would call out the name of the platoon leader in perfect English, telling him to withdraw his platoon because the remainder of the unit was withdrawing.

DISPLAYS

53. A unit can be tasked to conduct a display as a projection of the deception story. To do this, the unit presents a static projection to the enemy surveillance system using simulations, disguises, portrayals, or any combination thereof.

54. In a simulation, objects or systems that actually do not exist are projected onto the battlefield. These projections have varying requirements for authenticity, depending on the proximity of anticipated enemy observation, his detection equipment, and the amount of camouflage used.

55. Ammunition and supply dumps, airfields, air defence and field artillery emplacement, missile locations, bridges, and field fortifications have been simulated successfully.

56. Simulations are also useful when the deception objective calls for enemy fire. The simulation may deliberately violate one or more of the principles of camouflage, revealing the object to enemy engagement. The real object, if there is one, remains concealed.

57. In other instances, it may be useful to set up salvaged or fabricated decoy equipment and prepare weapons positions, deliberately exposing their phoniness. Once the enemy has dismissed these positions as decoys, they can be occupied as real positions (see Figure 5-5).

58. Disguises. A disguise involves altering an object to make it look like something else. Since many military objects or installations are extremely difficult to conceal completely, it may be easier and more desirable to disguise their appearance. Disguise can also make high value targets (HVTs) appear to be of little or no value. For example, tanks, artillery, missile carriers, and gasoline trucks may be disguised to appear as large cargo trucks; railroad tank cars may be disguised as empty boxcars or coal cars.

59. Portrayals. A portrayal presents to the enemy a unit that does not exist or is of a different type. For example, elements of a cavalry unit might be used to portray an armour unit. Units associated with a particular activity or echelon can be used to enhance a deception operation designed to portray false friendly order of battle to enemy analysts. For example, the presence of elements of a combat support unit that doctrinally support an armour unit can lend credibility to a deception story that portrays an armour unit in a particular area. While a portrayal is considered an act in itself, it usually includes the use of disguises and simulations.

60. The following situation shows the relationship between, objective, story, and techniques of the deception. The objective is to cause the enemy to move part of his reserve from the zone of the brigade making the main attack. The story is that the brigade in the south will make the main attack. The commander, using knowledge developed during analysis, selects the technique on which his deception will be built. He then adds additional tasks to complete and support the presentation of the story. In the case of our sketch map situation (see Figure 5-6), the phoney attack in the south is a feint. There will be displays to provide the enemy with indicators of logistic build-up and MCD to indicate increased communication activity in the zone (such as ruses and demonstrations in the form of increased combat reconnaissance). Instructions include steps to hide the preparation for the initial actions of the unit's true operation. In other words, the information denial requirements depend heavily on the commander's ability to visualise

the battlefield and select those activities that would provide indications of the true operation.

61. Remember that many activities that take place in the battle area do not change much, regardless of the tactical course of action being followed. The commander and staff must therefore identify those specific activities that can reveal the true operation as critical. The commander must assign participating units to those critical activities. So, in effect there are two aspects of deception that must be brought together in instructions or orders: that which we want the enemy to perceive and that which we must hide.

62. Historical Example. In September 1944, the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Reinforced) occupied a 36 km front on the left flank of XX (US) Corps on the Metz Front. This squadron portrayed an armoured division for a period of several weeks, and was so successful that the German order of battle maps showed the 14th (US) Armoured Division to be in the area. At the time, however, the 14th Armoured Division was not in Europe.



Figure 5-5: Use of Decoys



Figure 5-6: Feint

CHAPTER 6
DECEPTION IN OPERATIONS

All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.

Sun Tzu, 500 B.C.

GENERAL

1. Deception should be used selectively. It is unwise to attempt a deception with every operation. The opportunity for success must exist for deception to work. This opportunity will not be manifested in every situation. The opportunity must justify the resources that are expended in a detailed deception effort. Further, blanket use of deception may degrade deception emphasis among friendly forces. This may lead to stereotyped planning and execution. Still, the opportunity for a successful deception operation can appear during the conduct of virtually all types of military operations. This chapter presents techniques and considerations to confuse and mislead an enemy force. Although the deception techniques are grouped under specific operations (offence, defence, and so forth), these groupings are not restrictive. Imaginative planners can and should adapt these techniques to other operational postures.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

2. In the offence, the commander must mobilise and deploy his forces while retaining security. Thus, he can avoid sacrificing surprise or drawing a pre-emptive attack. Tightened security is usually maintained while planning a surprise attack. However, OPSEC alone cannot conceal large-scale operations. Specific warning signals almost inevitably filter through the security screen. As the attacker's preparations unfold, drawing more people into planning or movement, material indicators increase in frequency and specificity. The more technologically sophisticated the forces, the more susceptible they are to detection.

3. Deception is used in the offence to help achieve the element of surprise and by doing so, greatly enhance your offensive capability. An important consideration in battlefield deception is that you must be able to exercise some influence over the battlefield. You need to influence the development of the battle through some offensive action and not merely react to the enemy's offensive initiative. Showing the enemy physical evidence of a particular intention is the most convincing way to sell the deception story. The ability to exercise some offensive initiative significantly increases your deception options. Offensive operations, then, are ideally suited for the planning and execution of a wide variety of deception operations.

4. To be most effective, your deception should be employed in an environment in which you have more options available to you than the enemy has forces to cover in strength. If he can effectively defend against all avenues of approach, then deceiving him as to your choice becomes much less significant.

5. As your influence over the battlefield begins to increase, your options and, therefore, your opportunity for deception begin to increase. As the enemy's influence begins to diminish, his intelligence collection capability becomes more and more degraded by your increasing control of the battlefield. Consequently, his ability to assess your capabilities and probable intentions shifts to an environment of relative uncertainty. The opportunities for deception continue to increase. The enemy is required to make more and more tactical decisions based on the remaining, often uncorroborated, intelligence. Conversely, as the enemy begins to lose his active intelligence collection capability, his ability to detect your deception story becomes progressively more difficult.

6. Established procedures make combat operations easier to conduct but they also enable the enemy to anticipate our moves. These procedures result in distinct patterns, and our offensive patterns are well known. Many commanders have greatly enhanced their offensive capabilities by applying deceptive variations to these patterns. If in studying your unit's battlefield history, you find a stereotyped pattern, use it for deception. Feed the stereotype to the enemy's collections effort while you do something else, somewhere else. Examples of deception techniques for offensive operations are discussed below; they also apply to other operational postures.

NIGHT MOVEMENT

7. Prior to the attack, forces must be concealed. Prior to the arrival of the main force in any offensive situation, consider:

a. night movements;

b. closely controlled traffic; and

c. preparation of all positions, including camouflage.

DECOYS

8. Planning should include the provision of something for the enemy intelligence system to find (such as a decoy force). Planning should allow for visual and sonic detection. In addition, sufficient electromagnetic and inflated emitters should be used. This provides indicators of the size of force being simulated. (See Annex E for a detailed discussion of the employment of decoys)

BOMBARDEMENT

9. When preparing for an attack, place preparation fires and aerial bombardments at the usual or higher degree of intensity at those avenues parallel to the main route of advance. This will confuse and deceive the enemy as to the true intent of your attacking force.

DUMMY REPLACEMENTS

10. Moving artillery into supporting positions and purposely revealing other signs of preparing for an operation can deceive the enemy into believing we are planning an operation in an area where we are not. The enemy's attention is drawn to this area and his activity indicates his interest or concern. We can, under cover of darkness or reduced visibility, reposition the majority of our artillery pieces. The units move directly into selected and camouflaged positions. Our repositioning actions must not alert the enemy to our true intentions; therefore, activity at the deception site remains as previously displayed and witnessed by the enemy. Decoys replace withdrawn equipment. By using flash simulators or explosive

charges along with some real pieces left in position, the enemy continues to believe we are preparing for an attack in the area.

NORMAL PROCEDURES

11. Intensifying patrol and reconnaissance activities in areas other than those of the main attack will also confuse the enemy. However, your activities should not differ from normal procedures to the extent that you might reveal that you are engaged in deception.

12. Frequent raids or strong feints may harass the enemy to the extent that he becomes confused and, possibly, careless. He may become accustomed to our pattern of activity and not detect the main attack launch. He may think it is another harassing action.

13. Building on the enemy's preconceptions. Allenby did exactly this at the Battle of Megiddo in 1918 where he reasoned that the Germans had linked his name and Turks with a cavalry thrust against their flank. Accordingly, his deception operations were designed to reinforce this notion and he attacked elsewhere.

14. For most offensive situations, such as an attack on a river line, we have set procedures on how to conduct the operation. For example, we will:

a. secure the river line;

b. rehearse the troops;

c. bring up river crossing equipment;

d. conduct reconnaissance of the enemy's side; and

e. begin artillery operations and air strikes.

15. If the attacker effectively portrays these kinds of activity at one or more plausible locations away from the intended crossing sites, he will greatly increase his potential for surprise and success. A method successfully used by commanders has been to attack over an avenue of approach other than what is considered to be the most plausible or best. The Soviets in World War II would prepare for an attack in a position that

was on a plausible (if not best) avenue of approach. This would focus attention away from the real position. They would then move great distances under cover of darkness to arrive at the actual area of offensive operations.

16. Commanders often disregard the possibility of conducting operations along what they believe to be the unacceptable avenue of attack. Some commanders however, have demonstrated they could overcome a superior force by doing what is believed to be unsound. As Napoleon said: "An army can always pass in any season wherever two men can plant their feet." General MacArthur demonstrated the soundness of using the unacceptable avenue of approach when he conducted the Inchon Landing in September of 1950 and so did Hannibal by crossing the Alps.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

17. Deception is used in defence to conceal the true locations of our forces in the battle area and to mislead the enemy. By concealing our real location we minimise losses. We cause the enemy to expend fire power and intelligence efforts unprofitably. By misleading the enemy, we can cause him to attack or deploy unwisely.

18. The deception plan for the defence ranges from decentralised efforts by each unit to a carefully coordinated master plan designed to cause the enemy large-unit commander to attack or deploy in an unfavourable manner.

19. Regardless of how targets are first detected, the enemy will normally confirm them by photographs or direct observation. Most air strikes and artillery registrations will be based on final visual adjustments as well. Creating false targets to cause the enemy to waste reconnaissance efforts and firepower is a concurrent, coordinated activity during all phases of the defence.

20. In the defence, inertia is truly the ally of deception. If, for instance, the enemy has decided on one course of action, it is easier to convince him to continue that course rather than alter his plans or tactics. Deliberate planning and speed of execution characterise offensive operations. A successful deception operation conducted by a defender can result in the inappropriate deployment of attacking enemy forces. The far easier task of maintaining that deception can result in the continued

commitment of enemy forces at a time and location least advantageous to them.

AVOID PATTERNS

21. As in the offence, our defensive patterns are also well known. Beginning with reconnaissance, we take a look at the entire area and then concentrate on those locales selected for occupation and use. Activity becomes more and more concentrated. It culminates with troops arriving, digging-in, clearing fields of fire, and finally, camouflaging positions.

22. If we intend to deceive the enemy or to deny him information about our activities, we must alter this pattern. We should follow our established procedures in those areas not intended for actual defence. We should avoid them to the extent possible in the real battle position. This way we can mislead the enemy into expending his efforts needlessly.

DECEPTIVE POSITIONING OF FORCES

23. Using a map, the normal distribution of command posts (CP), logistic installations, and unit positions in a defence can be plotted with reasonable accuracy. An enemy intelligence analyst can do the same. In a conflict where the enemy has effective support and uses artillery and missiles extensively, placing forces in logical or ideal positions will probably negate even the best camouflage efforts. You should consider placing installations in unsuspected areas and troops on less obvious terrain. You must determine if you can do so and still accomplish your mission. After forces are positioned and preparations for the defence have begun, other logical, unoccupied positions should be selected which will allow detection. Leaving some soil scattered about indicates continuous use. Some troops should be present to provide visible activity in the area.

24. At the true defensive position, the opposite approach is taken. Units must dig-in and camouflage positions to protect against ground and air observation. This should be done even if their location is behind the line of contact. High-level air photography does not respect distance. An attacking enemy is interested in the preparation of defensive position in-depth on the battlefield.

25. Totally effective camouflage serves no purpose if the enemy has photographed earlier careless actions. The detection of just one pile of fresh earth can draw detailed attention. Conversely, those areas where there are no troops should be considered for the intentional display of such attention-grabbers. This is especially true if the unit has a poor history of maintaining OPSEC discipline.

CONCEALED ARTILLERY POSITIONS

26. The skilful concealment of artillery can add greatly to the element of surprise; thus, to the success of the defence. Enemy observers are trained to search for indications of artillery and missile units. These include:

a. imperfectly camouflaged weapon positions,

b. blast areas,

c. litter, and

d. foot paths or wheel tracks.

27. Artillery positions should be prepared prior to unit arrival and they should be occupied during periods of reduced visibility. Concealment can be enhanced by moving artillery into positions, not as a unit, but by weapon echelon. In battery positions, guns should be dispersed at irregular intervals. To avoid making tracks, consider setting weapons next to a road. Surveillance equipment and fire control centres should also be camouflaged. The electromagnetic signatures of artillery units are extensive; therefore, efforts must be made to reduce them while those signatures are replicated elsewhere.

DECEPTIVE POSITIONS

28. Decoys are extremely important in deception planning. Two-dimensional or three-dimensional decoys may be available. If not, the commander can use locally available items such as telephone and fence poles, posts, logs, ammunition cylinders, or other objects to fabricate decoy devices. A log sticking out of a pile of brush can draw a lot of attention and artillery fire. The use of detonation cord and smoke simulators may be helpful. Placing a section of weapons in a display area can distort the

enemy's picture of our dispositions. This can lead to the fruitless expenditure of his resources. Although the simulation of missile sites, with their associated electronic equipment, is difficult, dividends can be great.

29. One of the most effective decoys for deceptive artillery, air defence, or missile activity is a damaged or salvaged item. For added realism, use real weapons with the decoys. When a real piece is fired, activate a flash device by the decoy. Periodically rotate the real equipment and the decoys to further enhance the deception. A substantial portion of the enemy's available air strikes and artillery or missile fire might be directed unprofitably by using weapon firing or activity simulation. Another method of adding realism to an artillery decoy is using the decoy position as an offset registration position or as a roving gun position.

TRACKS

30. Vehicle tracks are a special concern when using deception in defensive operations. From reconnaissance activities through troop arrival, detailed consideration must be given to the tracks typically created by personnel and vehicles. A track plan should be developed to take advantage of existing roads and overhead cover. It should include paralleling hedge rows and fence lines to conceal movement. Enemy air photos compared on consecutive days will pinpoint unit locations if tracks are not concealed. Where tracks are unavoidable, they should continue past the true destination to a logical but unused termination area.

31. Areas that are not actually occupied by defensive forces or installations should display appropriate vehicle tracks. A careful selection of these areas, accompanied by the display of decoys, may draw a substantial number of air strikes and artillery rounds. Using troops during daylight hours and adding new tracks and other observable signs can reveal the display. The following ideas are offered with defence in mind, but variations may be adapted to other operational postures:

a. Having all units use the same shoulder patch, bumper markings, and CP signs can conceal the size of the force in any area.

b. Dummy haystacks over CPs or weapon positions; dummy peasant huts or grass shacks hiding bunkers; ammunition

stacked up to represent the general mass of a masonry wall. All can be effective under the proper circumstances.

c. The number of troops occupying a position could be nationally increased by using helmets, dummy positions, and dummy weapons.

d. In decoy areas, exaggerate the effect of enemy artillery or air strikes with gasoline, smoke bombs, fires, and explosions.

e. Change all traffic signs in the defensive area to confuse rapidly moving attack forces. (Of course, your own personnel must be able to read a map).

f. Tape record conversations between supporting aircraft pilots and ground personnel. Then, during the enemy's preparation for the attack, if air support is not available to you, play a tape over the radio indicating air support is on the way.

WITHDRAWAL AND DELAY OPERATIONS

32. Deception is necessary to reduce the inherent vulnerability of a unit during movement to the rear. Deception should be used to help maintain secrecy during the movement and to aid in achieving surprise in unit relocation. A withdrawing force can inflict heavy punishment and cause considerable delay to the enemy through the proper use of deception. The commander should take maximum advantage of darkness and other conditions of reduced visibility.

33. Any daylight activities that might disclose the intention to withdraw, such as abnormal vehicle movement to the rear, are prohibited. Necessary daylight motor movements, including reconnaissance, are made by infiltration. Also, units must ensure that noise does not betray the withdrawal. Delay operations, enhanced through the use of deception, can provide maximum loss of enemy personnel and equipment with the minimum use of friendly resources.

34. Dummy minefield can be used very effectively in the retrograde to slow and canalise the enemy attack or cause the enemy to mass his forces.

Dummy minefield might consist only of minefield markings and a few mines along the edges to add realism. Another possibility is to establish fake minefield, but to plant real mines in possible bypasses. Dummy minefields are most effective when mixed with real ones throughout the battlefield. The emplacement of dummy minefield requires the same authorisation, recording, and reporting procedures as the type minefield it is designed to replicate.

35. Delaying positions can be established on other than the most likely defensive position. When the enemy attacks the anticipated positions, he can be taken under fire from elsewhere. This deception can be greatly improved by establishing decoys in the notional area and camouflaging real positions.

36. Planning for delay and withdrawal includes coordination of EW activities to assist in the deception aspects. For example, prior to the retrograde, the unit could establish a pattern of counter surveillance jamming by time periods. Use daily times when electronically detectable equipment is to be withdrawn on D-day (for example, tanks and heavy vehicles). The pattern should be established far enough in advance of D-Day so the enemy does not place special significance on activation of the jammers at the time of withdrawal. The pattern of friendly electronic surveillance devices should establish that only a portion of the total friendly capability operates at one time. Thus, the absence of the surveillance positions withdrawn initially will not reveal the overall operation.

37. Consideration may be given to having some of the forward area personnel possess fake operation orders or maps. If an opportunity arises, they may be able to leave them for the enemy to find. Remember that it will be the circumstances surrounding the discovery of planted orders or maps that, ultimately, will determine the degree of success of this type of ruse.

38. Consideration may also be given to the initiation of preparations for an attack when a unit is actually performing a retrograde operation. Allow movement forward to the initial delay positions only during daylight hours. Permit daylight movement to the rear only through infiltration on resupply convoys, in helicopters, or on foot. Employ communication deception, sonic deception, and decoys.

39. A deception story of an attack, while a unit is actually in withdrawal or delay requires a situation where such a story is appropriate and plausible and it must be within the enemy's estimate of our capability.

RELIEF IN PLACE

40. Security is the key to a successful relief in place. A properly executed deception will enhance the opportunity for success. Usually the deception story will portray the occupying unit remaining in place. The appearance of normal activity in the area of operations is maintained during the relief. The incoming unit assumes the normal patterns of harassing and interdicting fires, patrols, communications, traffic, and movement from the outgoing unit.

41. Several days before the new unit occupies positions, radio operators and equipment should be incorporated into the outgoing communications system. This provides a continuity of communications signatures when the old unit departs. The operation should be so well coordinated that units moving in or out of the position need not use their radios until the move is complete. Operators in defensive positions should maintain normal communications at all times. If radio communications are necessary, the radio frequencies and call signs of the outgoing unit should be used initially by the incoming unit. This could reduce the effectiveness of enemy SIGINT.

42. Items of equipment that are moved to the rear and not replaced in kind should be replaced with decoys. If enemy agents or sympathisers are in the area, ensure that changing unit markings, shoulder patches, and so forth, do not give away the movements of the units.

PASSAGE OF LINES

43. A passage of lines is one of the most difficult military operations to execute. Since two or more units are temporarily occupying the same terrain, they are extremely vulnerable and lucrative targets. Deception techniques applicable to both offence and defence can and should be used to prevent the enemy from exploiting the potential confusion surrounding this kind of manoeuvre. Remember that the deception plans of the units involved must be coordinated to avoid unexpected and unwanted results.

44. The following are provocative ideas for you to expand, adjust, and envision on the battlefield; but most of all, these ideas should trigger your imagination:

a. Consider the simulation of unit movement. Jeeps dragging branches behind them raising clouds of dust can simulate convoys, reserves, or an armour unit. This movement should terminate in a logical area.

b. Using a loudspeaker system and a tape of noises normally accompanying such a move can enhance such a deception. If the physical aspects of the notional location are suitable, you will have created a fictitious unit with minimum assets.

c. Adding antennas to other vehicles in a formation will tend to deceive enemy gunners and observers as to which is your true command and control element.

d. If there are waterways in your area, fake and regular bridges should be augmented by the construction of underwater or rapidly emplaceable bridges as an alternate secret means of crossing.

e. Consider using planned communication security leaks. Perhaps while flying over an area you could chew out the commander for his poor use of camouflage in one of the decoy areas. Accompanied by a corrective action in the decoy area, this provides strong confirmation of the realism of that installation.

f. When a unit must secretly withdraw from an area to prepare for an operation, have the troops remaining in the area and/or the replacing unit assumes the identity, patches, bumper markings, call signs, and frequencies of the replaced unit.

g. Changing aircraft markings may result in the assumption by the enemy that a new aviation unit has been introduced into the area.

h. If conditions permit, consider causing confusion in enemy rear areas. Dropping empty parachutes behind enemy lines at night or conducting fake helicopter insertions can divert enemy resources from their primary mission.

i. To further confuse the enemy in his rear area, consider counterfeit posters placed where he can see them as he advances. Such posters might warn against movement into contaminated area. Others might warn that while certain colours of flares are not toxic, some are.

j. Rumours can be circulated deliberately by allowing civilian personnel or indiscreet military personnel to see and hear what is desired, or by making demands on civilian resources to supply mythical forces.

REAR OPERATIONS

45. To understand the relationship of deception to rear operations, the following areas must be analysed:

a. the threat to the rear area; and

b. intelligence activities which support deception in the rear area.

46. The enemy is expected to strike deep into our rear area, causing confusion, panic, total disruption of support, and a rapid degradation of military and civilian activity and of the desire to fight. Dedicated, highly trained individuals or groups are assigned such tasks. They conduct assassinations, kidnappings, and the destruction of HVTs such as airfields, nuclear capabilities, and other critical targets in the rear areas.

47. Deception planning and preparation must be done in the rear area. Not only must the multi-discipline collection threat be deceived, but also enemy and host-nation persons must be denied access to deception activities and objects. Although we have developed sophisticated methods for deceiving the enemy, an enemy agent will easily discover the deception if allowed physical access to deception sites.

48. Counter-intelligence (CI) assists in developing indications and warning information regarding the threat from enemy special operations forces and terrorist activities. The enemy may rely on human intelligence (HUMINT) to confirm indicators of the deception picked up by his SIGINT and imagery intelligence (IMINT) systems. In such cases, CI must assist in developing indicators that will deceive enemy HUMINT as well as SIGINT and IMINT. It is critical that ongoing CI operations and CI special operations do not conflict with deception efforts directed against enemy HUMINT. Additionally, deception efforts directed against enemy HUMINT must be coordinated with and support deception efforts directed against enemy SIGINT and IMINT. This will ensure that the enemy, from a multi-discipline point of view, receives information that is consistent.

49. Intelligence personnel must conduct a detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of the rear area to identify HVTs. Deception can be used in the rear area to:

a. help conceal critical nodes and HVTs;

b. provide decoy HVTs for enemy observation and exploitation;

c. draw enemy fire on decoy positions; or

d. cause the enemy to commit dedicated strike forces into positions where they can be ambushed and destroyed by friendly forces.

50. The objective of deception in support of rear operations is to deny the enemy factual information about rear area posture while causing him to lose the element of surprise, critical to effective penetration of our rear area. The problem facing the commander is to prevent the enemy from detecting the location of those forces that are massing for the attack. This includes the forces further to the rear that is being positioned to reinforce or exploit the developed situation. It is dangerous to depend only on concealment to hide this build-up. If the enemy doesn't locate anything, he will intensify his effort or will make educated guesses and seek to confirm them.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

51. Although battlefield deception and psychological operations (PSYOP) are both directed toward the enemy, they target different audiences and use different channels to reach these audiences.

52. Battlefield deception is directed toward the enemy commander and his staff. It is primarily intended for the attention of the enemy's intelligence organisation. PSYOP are directed toward enemy forces in general. Such media as leaflets, newspapers, pamphlets, loudspeakers, radio, television, and rumours disseminates propaganda, a tool of PSYOP. PSYOP support the deception operation by disseminating information that confirms or supports the deception story presented to the enemy through his intelligence channels. Prior consideration should be given to the possibility that such use may degrade or jeopardise the credibility sought or achieved by PSYOP supporting tactical forces. It is important that PSYOP in support of deception be thoroughly coordinated at all levels of command during the planning and execution phases of the operations.

ANNEX A
BATTLEFIELD DECEPTION ELEMENTS

CORPS

1. Corps provides deception planning support, participates in corps deception operations, and executes limited deception events with organic resources (such as decoys, communications deception, and logistic or critical node replication). The deception element is organic to the operation's battalion, corps MI Brigade. It is collocated with the G3 section of the corps tactical operations centre (CTOC) and operates under the staff supervision of the corps G3. This section coordinates with other elements within the CTOC, adjacent tactical operations centre (TOC) support elements, and higher and lower echelons. It ensures that deception operations are synchronised with integral aspects of corps operation plans. It provides deception training for corps elements.

2. The headquarters element provides command and control of the plans and operations section. It coordinates with the corps G3 to determine the planning and execution of combat, CS, and CSS events within corps deception operations. The plans and operations section:

a. recommends the deception objective;

b. recommends a deception story to reach the deception objective;

c. develops the deception plan that presents the deception story to the enemy's intelligence collection system;

d. recommends those deception events that must be conducted to execute the deception plan;

e. prepares the deception annex to the corps orders;

f. monitors, through coordination with the appropriate elements, the execution of the deception plan;

g. recommends appropriate changes to the deception operation as the situation dictates;

h. interprets the deception event tasking which it executes or supports. In doing so, it must determine the:

(1) signatures to be replicated;

(2) deception devices required to replicate those signatures; and

(3) methods to employ those devices which will achieve event reality and plausibility.

i. task organise materiel and manpower assets to implement deception events (deployment and employment of those deception devices organic to the element); and

j. is responsible for corps deception training.

DIVISION AND BRIGADE GROUP

3. Division and Brigade-group provide deception planning support to:

a. execute derivatives of the next higher headquarters deception operations;

b. execute the next higher headquarters deception operations; and

c. execute limited deception events with organic resources such as decoys, communications deception, and logistic or critical node replication.

4. Staff in the main headquarters performs deception planning activities. Staff assigned to deception duty coordinate with other elements within the division main, as well as higher and lower echelons to ensure that deception operations are synchronised with integral aspects of division operations plans. It provides deception training guidance for division elements.

5. The deception plans and operations section:

a. functions as the net control station for the battlefield deception elements;

b. recommends the deception objective;

c. recommends a deception story to achieve the deception objective;

d. develops the deception plan which presents the next higher headquarters' deception story to the enemy intelligence collection system ;

e. recommends those deception events that must be conducted to execute the deception plan;

f. prepares the deception annex to the operation order;

g. monitors, through coordination with appropriate elements, the execution of the deception plan;

h. recommends appropriate changes to the deception operation as the situation dictates; and

i. task organize team materiel and manpower assets to execute or support the execution of deception events.

6. The deception plan is implemented by creating a number of signature teams with integral and assigned corps assets. These teams can include:

a. communications signature team,

b. physical signature team,

c. electronic signature team, and

d. deception effectiveness evaluation team.

COMMUNICATIONS AND SIGNATURE TEAM

7. These teams are formed by regrouping signal and electronic warfare assets.

8. The team commander:

a. defines electromagnetic signatures;

b. identifies deception devices to be used in replicating electromagnetic signatures and profiles;

c. deploys and employs deception devices in support of unit deception operations;

d. provides communications input to the deception annex of the unit OPORD;

e. recommends selection and use of specific electronic equipment in deception operations;

f. plans the establishment of field sites;

g. prepares special, periodic, and project reports on communications signatures deception activities; and

h. provides advice and assistance on deception systems.

9. The communications specialists:

a. provide SIGINT expertise to support battlefield deception operations;

b. establish and maintain the SIGINT database;

c. assist in the preparation and establishment of field sites;

d. evaluate SIGINT activities to support deception operations;

e. prepare reports for dissemination to higher headquarters; and

f. provide advice and assistance on OPSEC surveys, communications security (COMSEC) activities, and counter-SIGINT activities.

PHYSICAL SIGNATURE TEAM

10. These teams can include personnel from all arms and services. Usually, however, the engineer will provide the specialised labour and other arms will provide the necessary actors and general labour.

11. The team commander:

a. prepares the physical signature deception plan for the deception annex of the operation order;

b. selects physical deception measures and organises material and personnel to be employed;

c. provides physical profile data base, Cl threat estimates, studies, and reports;

d. conducts liaison with other staff sections for consolidation and coordination of deception tasking; and

e. produces, disseminates, and evaluates physical deception measures for supported units.

12. The engineer performs the following duties:

a. prepares route, road, bridge, tunnel, ferry, and ford engineering reports for deception operations;

b. maintains unit database for profiles for employment of deception systems;

c. prepares and enacts systems to stimulate deception emplacement, equipment, activities, and personnel;

d. advises supported units in camouflage and concealment and non-electronic deception techniques to increase OPSEC to support deception;

e. recommends emplacement of and evaluates effectiveness of decoy deployment;

f. supervises, advises, and assists in the fabrication of deception decoys, camouflage, and other activities; and

g. evaluates terrain for deployment of deception equipment and systems in conjunction with manoeuvre arms personnel.

13. The manoeuvre arms personnel:

a. supervise tactical deployment of elements in offensive, defensive, and retrograde battlefield deception operations;

b. evaluate terrain for deployment of deception equipment and systems in conjunction with engineer;

c. uses technical and tactical expertise to evaluate effectiveness of decoy deployment;

d. establishes site security; and

e. participate in the construction of deception fortification and camouflage.

14. The terrain analyst:

a. analyses aerial and ground photos to assist in planning, execution, and evaluation of deception operations;

b. provides input on mission planning;

c. prepares specialised maps or terrain products;

d. assists in the preparation of map overlays, plots, mosaics, and charts to support deception operations; and

e. supervises the preparation and maintenance of required administration, terrain, and reference files.

15. The intelligence operator:

a. assists in planning, execution, and evaluation of deception operations;

b. provides input on mission planning;

c. prepares situation maps and maintains target folders;

d. assists in the preparation of map overlays, plots, mosaics, and charts to support deception operations; and

e. supervises the preparation and maintenance of required administration, intelligence, counter-intelligence and reference files.

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE TEAM

16. The section chief is normally an electronic warfare specialist who:

a. establishes and maintains non-communications profile of replicated units for deception operations;

b. establishes and maintains the non-communications electromagnetic signature database and technical reference material for deception employment;

c. determines mission objectives and priorities based on tasking received from higher headquarters; and

d. Provides input for the deception annex of the operation order.

17. The electronic warfare specialist:

a. identifies non-communications indicators associated with friendly forces that should be considered in deception planning;

b. provides advice and assistance on deception plans and operations; and

c. assists in developing non-communications data base.

DECEPTION EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION TEAM

18. The section chief is normally a counter-intelligence specialist who:

a. establishes the process by which the effectiveness of the deception operation is continuously evaluated;

b. advises on the enemy strength and weaknesses; and

c. advises on own strength and weakness

THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS

a. evaluates the enemy intelligence array;

b. recommends deception methods that are likely to be detected by, and be more effective on the enemy; and

c. evaluates the effect of our own deception on the enemy intelligence array.

19. The OPSEC specialist:

a. advises on critical vulnerabilities;

b. recommends protection measures;

c. identifies capability to protect the real intent and present the deception in a realistic fashion.

ANNEX B
DECEPTION PLANNING WORKSHEET

1. Situation.

    a. Current situation.

        (1) Friendly.

        (2) Enemy.

    b. Projected situation (no deception) .

    c. Desired situation.

    d. Assumptions (list key assumptions).

2. Deception Objective:

    a. Five elements:

        (1) Who?

        (2) What?

        (3) When?

        (4) Where?

        (5) Whom?

    b. List two or more deception objectives.

    c. Which deception objective is better?

    d. Do objective actions lead to the desired situation?

3. Desired Perception:

   a. What are the target's current perceptions about our capabilities and intentions?

   b. Should these perceptions be altered or maintained?

   c. Write a desired perception statement containing the three key elements:

      (1) Who?

      (2) What (threat or opportunity)?

      (3) When and for how long?

   d. Will this desired perception result in the deception objective actions necessary to reach the desired situation?

4. Deception Story:

   a. What must you tell the target to create or maintain the desired perception?

   b. Write the deception story you have developed for this operation (minimum of two sentences).

   c. Evaluate your deception story for feasibility and believability.

5. Deception Plan:

   a. List means selected to convey the deception story to the target.

   b. Have you considered all possible channels?

   c. Do the means you have selected conform to our standard operating practices?

   d. Are other disciplines needed to hide or protect something?

6. Other Information:

a. Feedback.

(1) List indicator priority intelligence requirements to help guide intelligence monitoring for enemy reactions to the deception.

(2) Is your deception flexible enough to allow for change if feedback reveals change is required to ensure success of the deception?

b. Risks (list most significant).

ANNEX C
SAMPLE DECEPTION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

1. Although the preparation of a deception annex to an operation order may or may not be required, a deception implementation schedule is often required to ensure a coordinated, controlled, multi-discipline effort. The degree of detail and method of dissemination will vary according to the deception plan, but an implementation plan is an essential tool.

2. The schedule is completed through the initiation of the true operation to include final actions in terminating the deception. In constructing the implementation schedule, the planner must visualize the battle area, use his imagination, and keep in mind that the schedule is a chronological presentation of the deception plan, bringing together all activities to provide a scenario of the operations. It then becomes a script for the actors (units) as illustrated below:

IMPLEMENTATION TIME	ASPECT OF DECEPTION STORY SUPPPORTED	TASK	ACTION	RESPONSIBLE UNIT	REMARKS
171630	12 CIB begins build-up of troops to south.	Begin movement control of troops for demonstration.	Vehicle traffic movement control points.	12 Arty Regt 1 R 22e R 2 RCR	Movement control enforced throughout deception ops.
171730	12 Arty Regt shows shift of direction toward city of Bucoda.	Notional shift A and B Coy 1 R 22e R and 2 RCR.	Use of visual/C&E to indicate recce and movement.	12 Arty Regt 1 R 22e R 2 RCR	Emission patterns to indicate rapid build-up of forces in 12 Arty Regt sector. Continue until 180500 (H-Hr).
171850	A and B Coy 1 R 22e R link up with 12 Arty Regt sector for main attack.	Show heavy traffic in 12 Arty Regt Sector.	Recce and coord parties along 12 Arty Regt and 1 R22e R sectors.	12 Arty Regt 1 R 22e R	1 R 22e R must conceal true action as covering force for withdrawal.
171930	2 RCR begins movement toward 12 Arty Regt to prepare for the attack.	Begin actual activities to show normal actions associated with movement of Bn.	Recce and coord parties along 12 Arty Regt and 1 R22e R sectors.	2 RCR	Must conceal actual intent of 2 RCR using electronic deception to replicate heavy traffic.

Figure C-3: Deception implementation schedule.

ANNEX D
DECEPTION EVALUATION CHECKLIST

G3 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

1. What integration of deception operations into tactical manoeuvres occurred?

2. Did the OPSEC annex support the deception annex?

3. Was the deception annex to the plan or order written to support tactical operations?

   a. Were individuals at all echelons identified and aware of their responsibilities in relation to deception activities?

   b. What were the required unit tasks?

   c. How was the deception annex coordinated? Was it complementary? Did it address a common list of indicators that required either display or concealment?

   d. Did other supporting annexes contain option choices addressed in the deception annex without alluding to deceptive intent?

   e. Does the deception annex address main and alternate courses of action in the basic operational concept?

4. Were surveys of both concealed sensitive indicators (OPSEC) and displayed deceptive indicators conducted to access visibility?

5. What was the deception objective?

   a. Did the deception objective closely support the objective of the tactical operation?

   b. Did the deception objective support corresponding OPSEC objectives?

c. Were phase-out actions planned to disguise that deception was used?

d. Was an implementing schedule prepared?

e. Did the implementing schedule identify the start and finish times of event, location, unit involved, and means to be used?

6. What was the deception story?

a. Was it employed as planned?

b. Did the deception story provide adequate information to deter the enemy from taking undesirable actions?

c. Was the story flexible enough to allow changes during its execution to take advantage of unexpected enemy actions?

7. Did compromise of intent of deception or OPSEC activity occur?

a. If yes, what was the compromise?

b. If yes, did the compromise degrade the overall success of the operation?

8. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?

9. What deception techniques were employed?

a. Were communication electronic deception and electronic protection measures planned and used? What was the desired effect?

b. Were non-communication electronic deception and electronic protection measures planned and used? What was the desired effect?

c. If the following non-electronic deception techniques were used, what was the desired effect of the techniques?

(1) ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance;

(2) aerial reconnaissance or activity;

(3) engineer activity;

(4) agent activity;

(5) vehicular movements;

(6) demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks;

(7) communications and coordination patterns;

(8) fire support and artillery activity;

(9) unit subordination;

(10) boundaries and phase lines;

(11) timing of operations;

(12) cover names and designations;

(13) camouflage; and

(14) other.

10. What resources (personnel, equipment, and time) were tasked to conduct operations with deceptive intent?

a. Were sufficient resources available?

b. What was the experience level of deception element personnel?

c. What specific deception items (dummies, decoys, and so forth) were constructed and used? (How? and Numbers?)

d. What other resources or services were required and were they available?

e. What real missions could not be accomplished because these resources were being used for deception?

f. Do the benefits of deception justify any loss of operational resources?

11. Were dedicated, secure communications lines and other means of transmission of the plan available? Were they adequate?

12. Was sufficient time available to formulate, write, and execute the deception and OPSEC plans?

13. What were the results of deception activities?

14. Did the deception assist in the successful execution of the overall operation?

G2 EVALUATION CHECKLIST

15. Were deception and OPSEC annexes to the op plan written to support tactical operations?

16. Does intelligence have an established enemy database and an understanding of enemy doctrine?

a. Were operations conducted mindful of enemy intelligence capabilities and collection schedules?

b. What were the PIR and IR for the deception and OPSEC plan?

c. What intelligence activities were targeted at discovering deceptions in progress against friendly forces?

d. What intelligence activities were targeted at determining enemy reaction to friendly deceptions?

e. What enemy activities were identified as being deception related? Why?

17. What was the deception story?

a. At what level of the enemy organisation was it focused?

b. Did the deception story cause the enemy decision-maker to make the desired decision?

c. Was the story consistent with the friendly unit's tactical doctrine, established patterns, and normal operational sequences?

d. Was the story consistent with the target's perception of the friendly unit's real capabilities?

e. Did the story permit verification by various enemy collection systems?

18. What counter surveillance techniques were used to deny the enemy knowledge of true intentions and evaluate indicator visibility?

19. What were the EEFI and were they integrated into the plan as specific, inherently low-visibility options? What options were chosen?

20. What deception steps were employed?

a. If communication electronic deception and electronic protection measures were planned and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?

b. If non-communication electronic deception and electronic protection measures were planned and used, what was the actual effect of these measures?

c. If the following non-electronic deception and OPSEC techniques were employed, what was the actual effect of the techniques?

(1) Ground reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance;

(2) aerial reconnaissance or activity;

(3) engineer activity;

(4) agent activity;

(5) vehicular movements;

(6) demonstrations, rehearsals, feints, and supporting attacks;

(7) communications and coordination patterns;

(8) fire support and artillery activity;

(9) unit subordination;

(10) boundaries and phase lines;

(11) timing of operations;

(12) cover names and designations;

(13) camouflage; and

(14) other.

21. Did the enemy's intelligence estimate of friendly capabilities warrant the use of deception with the expected expenditure of personnel and equipment?

22. Was there adequate time for the enemy to observe the deception and react in a desired manner?

23. What were the results of deception activities?

24. Were intelligence means and indicators established to measure enemy reaction to the friendly unit's deception?

ANNEX E
EMPLOYMENT OF DECOYS

GENERAL

1. A decoy is used to draw the enemy's attention away from a more important area. Generally, a decoy is an imitation of something on the battlefield. Decoys may be specially manufactured items or constructed locally (using salvage). Unserviceable or combat loss items may also be used as decoys.

2. The primary purpose of a decoy is to provide something for the enemy's intelligence system to find. For example, enemy HUMINT might locate a two-dimensional display. If the enemy decides to use IMINT for confirmation, all he will see in his photos are lines. However, the enemy was forced to use some of his intelligence assets on the deception, rather than on the true operation. If a decoy momentarily draws enemy attention from a real installation, it has served its purpose.

3. Decoys can be used for these additional purposes:

   a. as a survivability measure to draw enemy fire;

   b. to deceive the enemy about the number of friendly weapons, troops, or equipment;

   c. to replace withdrawn equipment;

   d. to add realism to a deception story; and

   e. to confuse the enemy on the of key terrain and reference points.

4. When constructing dummy or decoy installations, the following must be considered:

   a. location,

   b. movement,

c. signatures, and

d. camouflage.

LOCATION

5. Decoys must be located in logical positions. They should be far enough away from actual targets to prevent enemy fire directed at the decoy from hitting the real installation. This distance will depend on the size of the installation, the type of enemy observation, and the fire expected.

6. A decoy simulating a permanent or semi-permanent installation, such as an airfield, should have approximately the same relationship to nearby landmarks as the target itself. This is necessary to deceive the enemy, since he will use landmarks as reference points (terrain points).

MOVEMENT

7. Visual deception requires realistic progression. The deception activity must present personnel and vehicular movement. By comparing photographs taken at different times, the enemy can detect a lack of movement. Logical activity can be accomplished by movement of decoys and by operation of equipment. If possible, real troops should be used to provide evidence of occupancy. The activities must continue day and night and during periods of bad weather. Various tracks may be simulated as follows:

a. Desired foot tracks should be made by actual foot traffic. In a presumably occupied position, tracks must be continually increased in wear and width.

b. The best way to provide wheeled vehicle tracks is to run several vehicles through the area. This will create the illusion of movement.

c. Chains or logs may be dragged to create a greater scarring of the ground.

d. Tracked vehicle tracks are very difficult to duplicate accurately without using real equipment. Actual tracked vehicles should be used.

SIGNATURES

8. Since every unit has its own signature, decoy installations must be constructed in accordance with the friendly unit's SOP. To be effective, the decoy installation must include features normally associated with the real installation. Following are some considerations:

a. Spoil often indicates dug-in positions. If the unit normally practices good camouflage discipline and disposes of its spoil, the same practice must be followed with the simulated unit. On the other hand, if camouflage and spoil disciplines are poor, spoil must appear around the decoy position.

b. Latrines are present at virtually every occupied site. They are usually disclosed by tracks that converge and become more marked as time passes.

c. Concertina wire is a feature of almost all infantry combat positions. The presence of wire may be revealed by the tracks and trampling made by the wiring party. Gaps in the wire are often disclosed because of tracks that converge and diverge at the gaps.

d. Buried cable is often associated with important headquarters. It may also be associated with radar installations. Buried cable appears as a track, straight with angular turns, and light in tone.

e. Shelters, such as dugouts, appear as dark spots in a lighter area of man-made tracks and trampling. Spoil is also present. Airing blankets, laundry, and so forth may also be visible. Tenting or shacks are easily improvised and may be used as decoy shelters.

f. Thermal. All vehicle decoys have the ability to produce a thermal effect.

g. Electronic deception (see B-GL-353-001/FT-001).

CAMOUFLAGE

9. A decoy installation should be constructed so that its disclosure appears to be the result of poor camouflage. This may be done by:

a. leaving parts of the decoy exposed;

b. leaving exposed tracks;

c. incompletely concealing the shadows of decoys; and

d. improper use of surface texture and colour.

10. Decoys that are intended to divert attention from real objects (or installations) are effective only if the real objects are completely camouflaged.

11. When employing visual deception, all or part of a real or false military object may be camouflaged to project the desired effect. Camouflage may be done poorly (intentionally) so that the enemy will observe what we want him to observe, or a friendly unit may be completely concealed to avoid detection.

12. In any type or size of deception, it is important that projection of visual evidence be consistent. If a unit is being concealed by camouflage, all elements must be concealed totally.

DECOYS

13. Camouflage is essential; however, when it is impossible to conceal a CP in a certain area for example, a decoy CP should be erected in the vicinity. In this instance it is obvious that the decoy must look more like the real thing than its genuine counterpart. After all, we are hiding the real

and portraying the false. Certain characteristic signs of occupancy should be made at the decoy. This includes:

a. cross-country tracks simulating those made by a wire-laying detail;

b. antenna arrays to simulate communications facilities;

c. SED devices to provide an electromagnetic signature;

d. smoke and occasional lights;

e. a few poorly camouflaged tents;

f. new vehicle tracks and activity from day to day; and

g. other signs of activity.

14. Other signs which enhance the illusion of the presence of a CP are explained in the following examples:

a. converging wire lines and vehicle tracks. Also various types of antenna arrays for communications;

b. concentration of vehicles;

c. heavy traffic causing widened turn-ins;

d. new vehicle tracks to a position that could house a CP;

e. protective wire, foxholes, and other barriers surrounding the installation; and

f. defensive weapons emplacements around the installation.

15. One of the most difficult activities to conceal is the use of aircraft and its related support. The movement of aircraft into and out of an area is an immediate indicator to the enemy that something is happening or that an important facility (such as a CP) is located there. Since these signs cannot be eliminated, deception techniques must be used to mislead the enemy.

16. The enemy can detect either electronically or visually a pattern or location where aircraft continually fly over land or disappear from sight. Indiscriminate helicopter flights which can be visually, optically, and electronically detected call attention to the assembly areas, forward area rearm and refuel points, or brigade trains. Therefore, helicopter assembly areas must either be out of the enemy's radar detection range or have concealed routes into and out of the area. Entry and exit routes should be planned in as many areas as possible and used in a manner that avoids establishing a pattern. An assembly area should provide terrain masking to break the enemy radar line of sight. A thorough map analysis, coupled with the latest intelligence reports of enemy radar activity, helps determine radar-free areas.

LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS

17. Logistic and ammunition storage facilities are difficult to conceal. The size of these facilities and the vehicular movement into and out of the area attract the enemy's attention. The commander should consider requiring vehicles to move randomly (not in convoy) or only during periods of reduced visibility. The commander might consider using civilian trucks, converted buses, and civilian cars to carry supplies in rear areas.

18. Trains, houses, factories, buildings, subways, tunnels, caves, or buses should be used for physical storage of supplies and ammunition. These can also be used for maintenance, transportation, and medical operations. If practical, installations that have been partially destroyed by the enemy can be used or repaired to serve as a supply installation. The fact that the enemy considers the facility destroyed may serve to increase the realism of added camouflage.

19. Containers or packages can be disguised. This includes making packages look as though they contained civilian, not military, supplies. To conceal the supply activities in the combat area, supply personnel could be sent with the assault forces at the beginning of the operation. They could locate suitable logistic areas and camouflage them before supplies are brought forward.

20. Notional ammunition and supply dumps can be employed in a deception. Heavy concentrations of ammunition and supplies should be concealed. When the physical characteristics and size of the logistic

activities make concealment impractical, construction of decoy facilities in the same general area should be considered.

21. Deception supply routes should be used. In the past, friendly installations and disposition of forces have been dictated by road network availability. Careful consideration should be given to using secondary or non-centrally located road networks for logistic functions. The main supply route can be used as part of the deception plan. The forward area road networks can be made deceptive by using civilian personnel and animals whenever time and the situation permit. Another means of concealing supply movement is to use civilian vehicles over several secondary roads, selecting the routes at random.

22. A decoy supply point or log base should be near enough to appear to be realistic. However, it should be far enough away to allow for possible errors in targeting or marksmanship of any attacker.

23. Prominent landmarks must be noted and the decoy located as the real installation would be. (See Figure E-1 for the positioning of decoy supply points.) The decoy must appear to have a road net pattern the same as the real installation. In addition, personnel must be detailed to the decoy site to maintain the appearance of activity. If at all possible, route and control all traffic through the decoy area to the real supply point. If successful deception is essential, this measure will greatly enhance the decoy's chance of success. For a night deception, certain types of night lighting, such as light shown through a tent opening and a decoy fire, are very effective.



Figure E-1: Decoy Supply Point

COMMON FAULTS AND DEFECTS

24. The following are some general defects that often cause a decoy to fail:

a. regularity or irregularity of tracks;

b. lack of litter associated with military occupation;

c. flatness or no stereoscopic relief;

d. failure to faithfully simulate a particular type of installation;

e. absence of motor transportation and lack of movement;

f. no daily change in appearance;

g. incorrect tactical positioning;

h. unreasonable speed in build-up or removal;

i. lack of real air defence; and

j. failure to simulate all necessary components of a particular installation.

25. It should be evident that these defects apply to almost all types of decoys and deceptions. Any one of them could render worthless an otherwise perfect effort.